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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON CONSUMER BEHAVIOR AND RETAIL REGULATION
Ethan Mallick Hossain
Katja Seim
The retail sector is one of constant innovation, where retailers relentlessly compete
for customers by providing new products, better service, and attractive prices. At the
same time, regulators must keep pace with these innovations to ensure that markets
are fair and consumers are protected. This dissertation is composed of three chapters
that examine the interactions of consumer behavior and retail regulation.
The first chapter examines how bulk buying varies by household income and
analyzes the factors that affect a household’s bulk buying decision. Using reduced-
form methods and detailed household-level purchase data, I show that many factors,
including the cognitive costs of computing unit prices, store preferences, storage
costs, and budget constraints, affect a household’s bulk buying. I then estimate a
discrete-choice model that incorporates cognitive costs and storage costs and find that
mandating the display of unit prices would substantially increase bulk buying and
lower the unit prices paid by households, especially low-income households.
The second chapter studies how imposing sales taxes on previously tax-free online
purchases affects household shopping behavior. Historically, e-commerce was an easy
way for consumers to avoid sales taxes, but over the past decade, online retailers
were required to collect sales taxes, negating the structural price advantage they had.
Using detailed online shopping and browsing data, I find that in response to sales
tax collection, households reduce their spending at taxed online retailers, but find no
evidence that households change their search behavior or offline shopping expenditures.
The third chapter analyzes whether welfare transfers are linked to lottery gambling.
A minority of lottery retailers are eligible to accept Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP) benefits, but these stores account for a majority of lottery sales.
By combining novel data on store-level lottery sales with a range of policy shocks to
the SNAP program, this chapter finds that SNAP benefits decrease lottery gambling,
v
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Chapter 1
LESS IS MORE EXPENSIVE:
INCOME DIFFERENCES IN
BULK BUYING
By E. Mallick Hossain
1.1 Introduction
Grocery purchases account for a sizable share of a household’s discretionary spending,
especially for the lowest-income households (BLS 2019). To save money, households
often wait for sales, redeem coupons, or purchase generic brands (Griffith et al. 2009).
Low-income households also increase their home production to reduce their spending
(Aguiar and Hurst 2005). Quantity discounts are another way for households to save
money. Even though households buy more on a given shopping trip, they pay lower
unit prices, and reduce their overall spending.
My paper examines how large these quantity discounts are, how bulk buying varies
by income groups, and which factors influence the decision to buy in bulk. Most
explanations for why households pay different prices for the same product relate to
differences in search behavior. Prices vary based on where households shop or whether
they use coupons (Talukdar 2008; Griffith et al. 2009). However, even in the absence
of sales and coupons, prices for the same product can differ within a particular store
due to quantity discounts.
This paper contributes new findings that, despite the substantial savings available
from quantity discounts, low-income households are less likely to buy in bulk than
1
high-income households.1 Kunreuther (1973) provides the first evidence of this “bulk
buying gap” for a few specific products and Orhun and Palazzolo (2019) expands this
finding to a whole product category. Since households purchase a variety of products
when shopping, I show that the bulk buying gap exists across the full range of product
categories that households purchase.
I find that cognitive costs, store preferences, budget constraints, and storage costs
all contribute to this bulk buying gap. First, the cognitive costs of assessing price
differences across products can prevent households from making economical decisions
(Mitchell, Lennard, and McGoldrick 2003). Providing price information reduces the
effort needed to compare prices, and households change their purchase decisions
when relevant price information is displayed prominently (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft
2009; Bogomolova and Jarratt 2016). Posting unit prices reduces the cognitive costs
of comparing unit prices across different products. Sixteen states have regulations
governing the display of unit prices, but no study has evaluated the impact of these
regulations on consumer behavior. I provide the first nationwide study of the impact
of displaying unit prices on bulk purchasing and find that households are significantly
more likely to buy in bulk when retailers are mandated to display unit prices.
Second, households may also make different purchase decisions based on where
they live or where they choose to shop (Chung and Myers Jr 1999; Talukdar 2008;
Allcott et al. 2019). I show that even within neighborhoods, there are large differences
in bulk buying between high- and low-income households. On the other hand, income
differences in bulk buying are attenuated, but still substantial, after conditioning on
the type of store where households choose to shop.
Third, budget constraints affect bulk buying because low-income households may
not have enough cash on hand to purchase a bulk package. Leveraging within-month
variation in budgets, I show that the lowest-income households slightly decrease their
bulk purchasing towards the end of month, presumably when their budget constraint
is binding. In contrast, middle- and high-income households either do not change their
bulk buying or slightly increase their bulk buying towards the end of the month.
Fourth, storage costs also affect the bulk buying decision because even though
large packages provide lower unit prices, they are more cumbersome to store. I
1Throughout this paper, “high-income” refers to households making over $100,000 and “low-income”
refers to households making under $25,000.
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show that households are more likely to buy in bulk when they live in larger homes
and when products are smaller. I provide a new approach to estimate storage costs
cross-sectionally using differences in product “concentration.” One way of identifying
household-level storage costs compares purchase frequencies of households with the
same demand for a product (Hendel and Nevo 2006). A household with high storage
costs will purchase small packages more frequently. I propose a complementary
approach: I compare purchases of products that are otherwise identical, but differ
in their level of concentration. All else equal, households who buy smaller, more
concentrated packages have higher storage costs than those that buy larger, less
concentrated packages. Based on this approach, I find that low-income households
have higher storage costs than high-income households. On balance, this means that
firms extract higher rents from low-income households because they have less ability
to store for future consumption.
For my analysis, I combine household- and store-level datasets to study income
heterogeneity in bulk buying. Nielsen’s Consumer Panel data is a nationally repre-
sentative panel survey of household grocery purchases, and Nielsen’s Retail Scanner
data is a national panel of weekly UPC-level sales data from over 30,000 stores. I
construct a new dataset of state-level per-unit pricing regulations, including a measure
of regulatory stringency. I also use data on entry dates and locations of over 1,400
warehouse clubs in the United States. As a result, I have a comprehensive view of a
household’s possible product choices, available price information, retail environment,
and resulting expenditures.
I find that low-income households could realize substantial savings from buying in
bulk at the same rate as high-income households. To do this, I estimate the average
bulk discount for each product category based on Nielsen’s weekly store-level price
and product data. The average discount across all product categories is such that
a 10% larger package has a 5% lower unit price. Then, I estimate how much each
household buys in bulk using Nielsen’s household-level purchase data. Given each
product category-specific bulk discount and household-level bulk buying, I predict how
much low-income households could save if they increased their bulk buying intensity
to match that of high-income households. I find that low-income households would
reduce their annual grocery expenditures by 5% if they bought in bulk like high-income
3
households, saving an aggregate of $5.4 billion annually.
I then employ three differences-in-differences models to determine how much
cognitive costs, store preferences, and budget constraints affect bulk buying. The first
model uses a novel dataset that I compiled of state regulations regarding the display
of per-unit prices and exploits the fact that a significant share of households in the
Nielsen Consumer Panel moves between regulatory regimes when they move from
one state to another. Before households move to a state without unit price posting
requirements, their bulk buying behavior is similar to that of households that remain
in the same regulatory regime. After households move, however, I find that their bulk
buying is 4–5% lower than that of households who did not experience a regulatory
change.
The second differences-in-differences model shows how much store preferences,
particularly for warehouse clubs, affect bulk buying. The bulk buying gap narrows
substantially after controlling for the types of stores households shop at; high-income
households spend a larger portion of their budget at warehouse clubs. To estimate
the effect of warehouse clubs on bulk buying, I examine how bulk buying changes
within households before and after a warehouse club enters nearby. Before a warehouse
club enters, bulk buying is similar for households that will and will not experience
a warehouse club entry. After a warehouse club enters, however, I find bulk buying
increases by 5–10% compared to households that did not experience an entry within a
15-mile radius. This increase is only limited to middle- and high-income households
and is due to increased shopping at warehouse clubs.
The third differences-in-differences model analyzes how budget constraints affect
bulk buying. To do this, I analyze within-household changes in bulk buying over the
course of a month because the liquidity of poorer households decreases towards the
end of the month (Orhun and Palazzolo 2019). Using information on weekly bulk
buying from Nielsen, I find that low-income households slightly decrease their bulk
buying by 0.5–1% between the first half and second half of the month while middle-
and high-income households slightly increase their bulk buying by 0.5–1.5% over the
same period.
I also assess the importance of storage costs using differences in bulk buying relative
to the size of a household’s home and relative to the physical size of the product
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being purchased. I examine how a household’s bulk buying changes when it moves
to a different type of housing, after controlling for other within-household changes.
Bulk buying is 3–4% higher for the same household when it lives in a single-family
home relative to when it lives in an apartment, controlling for demographic differences
between households. I also find that the bulk buying gap is smaller for products with
smaller physical footprints.
Finally, I construct a discrete-choice model of consumer purchasing behavior to
quantify consumer preferences and disentangle the contributions of cognitive and
storage costs to the bulk buying decision. I estimate this model using data on toilet
paper purchases. Households choose a product based on price, quantity, quality, and
package size, which serves as a proxy for storage costs. I can separate preferences for
quantity from size preferences because I demonstrate that toilet paper comes in varying
"concentrations." I allow state-level unit pricing mandates to affect a household’s unit
price sensitivity. From this demand model, I simulate household responses to two
counterfactuals: 1) universally posting unit prices and 2) reducing storage costs.
My model predicts that requiring stores to post unit prices would reduce the bulk
buying gap in package size purchased between high- and low-income households by
26%. Reducing storage costs would close the remainder of the gap and low-income
households would actually buy more in bulk than high-income households. As a result
of these policies, households would buy larger quantities of toilet paper and pay lower
unit prices. Universally displaying unit prices would encourage households to better
utilize quantity discounts by reducing cognitive costs, increasing bulk buying, and
helping consumers save money.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data.
Section 1.3 documents new facts of quantity discounting. Section 1.4 presents evidence
of contributing factors to the bulk-buying gap. Section 1.5 introduces the model.
Section 1.6 presents estimation results. Section 1.7 details the counterfactual exercises
and Section 1.8 concludes.
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1.2 Data
In this section, I describe the datasets used for my analysis and give a brief overview
of their respective features.2 Nielsen’s Consumer Panel data provides information on
households’ shopping and purchasing decisions. Nielsen’s Retail Scanner data provides
information on weekly product assortments and prices. A new regulatory dataset
I construct contains information on state-level regulations regarding the display of
per-unit pricing. Finally, warehouse club data provides information on the location
and entry dates of warehouse clubs across the United States. By combining these data,
I have a comprehensive view into a household’s possible product choices, available
price information, retail environment, and their resulting purchase decision.
Nielsen Consumer Panel Data
I use the Nielsen Consumer Panel dataset from 2004–2017. This dataset is a panel of
about 178,000 unique households. I observe about 40,000 households each year from
2004–2006 and about 60,000 households each year from 2007–2017. Households scan
all items that they purchase and then input information about quantities, prices, date
of purchase, and store. Nielsen retains about 80% of its panel from year to year with
the mean and median tenure of a household being four and three years, respectively.
I consider food, drink, and non-food grocery (e.g., paper towels, toilet paper,
detergent, etc.) purchases made at grocery stores, discount stores, dollar stores,
warehouse clubs, and drug stores. These outlets account for over 90% of household
expenditures in these categories. I exclude alcohol, tobacco, health, and general
merchandise products from my analysis since these products (e.g., cigarettes, painkillers,
etc.) may have different consumption patterns than grocery products or are not suited
for bulk purchases (e.g., printers, cookware, linens). I also exclude households with
a student or military head of household as well as those with an annual income of
less than $5,000 and those living in mobile homes. Only about 7% of households are
excluded and I use the remaining 166,000 households for my analysis. See Appendix
1.A for further details of sample construction.
2Researcher’s own analyses derived based in part on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC
and marketing databases provided through the Nielsen Datasets at the Kilts Center for Marketing
Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business.
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Nielsen computes projection weights to ensure their sample is nationally repre-
sentative. Weights are calculated to match population moments based on household
size, income, age, race, ethnicity, education, occupation, and presence of children.
All analyses use these projection weights unless otherwise stated. Nielsen groups
household income into 16 different income bins. Due to the large number of bins, in
tables and parts of the text, I will report differences by income quartiles. However,
where possible (especially in graphs), I will report estimates for each income bin. Table
1.1 presents descriptive statistics for households in the sample.
Table 1.1: Nielsen Consumer Panel Summary Statistics
Variable Mean SD 25th Pctile 75th Pctile
Household income ($000s) 57.13 31.17 27.5 85
Household size 2.56 1.45 1 3
Age 52.59 14.39 41.5 63
College educated 0.39 0.49 0 1
Child present 0.33 0.47 0 1
Married 0.50 0.50 0 1
N (Household-Years) 734,724
N (Households) 166,163
Note: Household income is grouped into bins. Midpoints of each bin are used in order to
calculated sample moments. Data are weighted for national representativeness.
Nielsen Scanner Data
The Nielsen Scanner data contains average weekly prices and volume sold of individual
products at about 35,000 stores from about 90 retail chains between 2006–2016.
Average prices are weighted by the volume sold. Only products with positive sales in
a given week are recorded. I match the Retail Scanner data with the Consumer Panel
data based on store identification numbers and purchase dates. By matching the two




I compile a novel dataset on state-level regulations regarding the display of unit prices.
The data is based on annual regulatory updates aggregated in Handbook 130 published
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST 2019). I cross-check this
information with state regulatory codes and state officials to ensure accuracy. This
data includes information on which states have regulations, when they were adopted,
and how stringent these regulations are. More details are discussed in Section 1.4.
Warehouse Club Data
I also use data on all warehouse clubs in the United States between 2004–2015 gathered
by Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Koustas (2017). This data records information on
the opening dates, locations, and identity of all warehouse clubs in the United States.
It was gathered by combining information available on company websites, annual
reports, and by contacting firms.
1.3 Stylized Facts
In this section, I document two new facts about quantity discounts. First, I show
that quantity discounts apply to 91% of grocery categories. Second, I document that
households making over $100,000 are 26% more likely to buy non-food items in bulk
than households making $5,000–$8,000 annually, compared to only 3% for food items.
Combining these findings, I estimate that low-income households could reduce their
grocery expenditures by 5%, saving an aggregate of $5.4 billion annually, simply by
buying in bulk at the same rate as high-income households.
Quantity Discount Prevalence
Quantity discounts are a specific form of non-linear pricing in which unit prices
decrease as package size increases. To establish the prevalence and magnitude of
quantity discounts, I use Nielsen’s Retail Scanner data from 2016. I estimate quantity
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discounts using the following regression for each of the 693 product categories:3
ln(P )ibm = α + β ln(Size)ibm + λbm + εibm, (1.1)
where Pibm is the unit price (package price divided by package size) of product i from
brand b purchased in market m (defined as a store-week). Sizeibm is the item’s package
size, which is the number of units included in a UPC (e.g., quart, square feet, count,
pound, etc.). λbm is a brand-store-week fixed effect. Variation in unit prices across
package sizes within the same brand-store-week identify β.4 If retailers offer quantity
discounts, then β will be negative.
Figure 1.1 plots the distribution of β across product categories (statistically
insignificant betas are zero). 91% of all product categories have a statistically significant
and negative β and non-food items generally have larger discounts than food items.5
The median β is -0.51 for non-food products, which means that a 10% increase in
package size is associated with a 5.1% decrease in unit price. This discount is larger
than the median β for food items (-0.43).6 The size and near-universality of quantity
discounts suggest they offer substantial savings to households without sacrificing
consumption.7
Bulk Purchasing
Given how common and how large quantity discounts are, households can use quantity
discounts to save money on a wide range of items. However, since food products
deteriorate while non-food products do not, bulk buying will likely differ between
348 categories could not be estimated typically because the data did not have sufficient variation.
These were generally uncommon categories like mushroom sauce, canned grapes, and canned chow
mein.
4Some readers may be concerned that the positive sales threshold limits the number of weeks
products are observed. I find that a large majority of products (at the UPC level) are observed for
over half of the year. The unobserved weeks can be attributed to a variety of reasons including zero
sales, discontinued products, or missing reports from retailers. Observing products for most weeks of
the year limits the possibility that quantity discounts are estimated on a limited subset of weeks.
5Some products do have a significantly positive coefficient, indicating that unit prices increase
with package size. These quantity “surcharges” are less common, but have been highlighted before
(Sprott, Manning, and Miyazaki 2003).
6These findings are robust to outliers. Winsorizing unit prices at the 98th and 90th percentile
produces almost identical estimates.
7For a comparison of quantity discounts with coupons, see Appendix 1.A.
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Product Type Food Non−Food
Note: Using Nielsen Retail Scanner data from 2016, this figure plots the distribution of
coefficients from a regression of log unit price on log package size (Equation (1.1)) for individual
product categories. Regression controls for store-brand-week fixed effects. Histogram plots
645 product categories.
food and non-food items. Because of these differences, I analyze food and non-food
products separately. Following the literature, I classify a product as “bulk” if it is in
the top two quintiles of the size distribution for that product category (Griffith et al.
2009).8 Then, for each household, I compute the expenditure share of bulk purchases
of food and non-food items. I then regress this “bulk share” on household income
and other household characteristics that could affect consumption patterns and may
be correlated with income, and plot the income coefficients. The equation below is
estimated on food and non-food purchases separately:
BulkShareimt = α +
∑
q
βqIncomeimt + γXimt + λm + λt + εimt, (1.2)
8This definition avoids the risk of too narrowly defining bulk and only capturing purchases that
occur solely at warehouse clubs. This broader definition helps capture large sizes that are available
at grocery stores and mass merchandisers.
10
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Product Type ● Food Non−Food
Note: Using 2004–2017 Nielsen Consumer Panel data, this figure plots the income bin
coefficients from Equation (1.2), which regresses the share of annual purchases that were
bulk packages on household characteristics as well as market and year fixed effects. Nielsen
projection weights are used to ensure national representativeness. Households making $5–8k
are the reference group.
where BulkShareimt is household i’s share of bulk purchases in market m in year t
(a market is a county). Incomeimt consists of dummies for each income bin q. Ximt
consists of household characteristics (age, household composition, marital status,
education, housing type, tract-level vehicle access).9 Year and market fixed effects are
captured by λt and λm.
Figure 1.2 illustrates that bulk purchases compose a 10 percentage point larger
share of non-food expenditures for households making over $100,000 compared to those
making $5,000–$8,000. As income increases, bulk purchases make up an increasing
share of expenditures. For food items, there is a more muted increase of one percentage
point across income groups.
The 10 percentage point gap is quite large. For the average household making
9These characteristics are used consistently throughout the paper. See Appendix 1.A for details
of demographic variables and how they are collected.
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between $5,000-8,000, 39.6% of their non-food grocery spending is on bulk packages.
Hence, households making over $100,000 are 26% more likely to buy in bulk relative
to the lowest-income group.
These patterns are consistent with high-income households buying in bulk, obtain-
ing low unit prices, and consuming out of storage. Given the existence of quantity
discounts, larger packages generally correspond to lower unit prices. The fact that
low-income households are less likely to buy these storable items in bulk suggests that
some obstacles may prevent them from buying and storing large packages.10
Because the bulk buying gap is largest for non-food products, the rest of this
paper focuses on non-food products. These products are ideal for analyzing bulk
purchasing because they isolate the key features that make bulk buying and quantity
discounts attractive for households. Primarily, households can store items for future
consumption. Additionally, these products generally do not have substitutes and
they cannot be produced at home (e.g., toilet paper, diapers, etc.). My findings
carry over to food products, but one must be careful to account for perishability,
which counteracts product storability. Additionally, many food products have close
substitutes (e.g., soda, juice, water, etc.) and home production (e.g., cooking meals)
can substitute for many products (Aguiar and Hurst 2005; Aguiar and Hurst 2007).
Savings from Bulk Buying
In this subsection, I calculate the savings that low-income households could achieve
from buying in bulk like high-income households. For each product category, I compute
the average difference in package sizes by estimating the following regression:
ln(AvgSize)imt = α +
∑
q
βqIncomeimt + γXimt + λm + λt + εimt, (1.3)
where AvgSizeimt is the quantity-weighted average package size purchased by house-
hold i in market m in year t, where a market is a DMA.11 Incomeimt is an indicator
for a household’s income quartile. X controls for household characteristics. Market
and year fixed effects are included through λm and λt.
10This relationship persists across most categories. Appendix 1.A shows the same pattern for a
few popular categories and Figure 1.8 illustrates the difference for all non-food categories.
11Average package size is weighted by quantity to account for the fact that an unweighted average
would favor small packages.
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In this regression, βq gives the average log-difference between the package size pur-
chased by a household in income quartile q and the lowest-income quartile (households
making less than $25,000).12 To compute savings, I multiply this average difference in
package size purchased by the category-specific quantity discount estimated in Section
1.3. For example, high-income households buy 30% larger packages of toilet paper
which has a quantity discount of 0.216. Therefore, low-income households could save
0.3× 0.216 = 0.0648 or 6.5% from buying big packages like high-income households do.
Aggregating across all categories where high-income households buy larger packages
gives an estimated savings of 5%, or $215, per year.13,14
Saving 5% on these common household purchases is substantial for low-income
households. For the bottom quintile of the income distribution, these items account
for 30% of their discretionary spending compared to 19% for the top quintile of the
distribution.15 If the about 24.4 million households making under $25,000 were to
obtain these savings, that would be an overall savings of $5.4 billion annually, assuming
no supply-side changes.16 For context, this is equal to 8% of the $68 billion federal
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program budget in 2017 (USDA 2019). These
potential savings do not require low-income households to buy more over the course
of the year because buying in bulk does not necessarily change how much households
consume. It just changes how much they buy at one time.
12I use quartiles to reduce the number of income bins from 15 to 4, but results hold at more
granular levels. Disaggregated results are available upon request.
13This averages only across categories where high-income households buy larger packages. There
are some categories, such as septic tank cleaners, in which high-income households buy in smaller
packages. Imposing that low-income households buy the same average size across all categories
reduces projected savings to 2.3%.
14The first-best calculations of savings would identify the product with the lowest unit price given
a household’s brand and store choice and compute savings based on that product. This estimate
will likely be substantially higher than what I computed, so I view the estimated 5% savings as a
conservative estimate of potential savings. See Appendix 1.A for calculations of savings on popular
product categories.
15Discretionary spending is defined as total expenditures minus expenditures on shelter, utilities,
transportation, healthcare, cash contributions, personal insurance, and pensions. Calculation is based
on expenditure data on food at home and housekeeping supplies from Table 1 of the 2017 Consumer
Expenditure Survey available at https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/consumer-expenditures/
2017/home.htm
16Household count comes from Table B19001 of the 2017 1-year American Community Survey.
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1.4 Factors Affecting Bulk Buying
In this section, I show that cognitive costs, store preferences, budget constraints, and
storage costs affect the bulk buying decision. To do this, I use plausibly exogenous
variation and natural experiments to estimate the causal impact of unit pricing
regulation and warehouse club entry on bulk purchasing. Since the biggest differences
in bulk buying are for non-food grocery items, all analysis is restricted to non-food
products.
Cognitive Costs
Cognitive costs are the first possible contributor to the bulk buying decision. Con-
sumers may not be aware of the quantity discount (or how valuable it is) because
they do not compute unit prices when making purchases. To test this hypothesis, I
utilize a novel hand-collected dataset of state-level unit-price regulations requiring
retailers to display per-unit prices. Displaying per-unit prices reduces cognitive costs
and households can more easily compare products and pick the one with the best
value.
Unit price labeling dates back to the late 1960s and early 1970s. During this
period, a large consumer protection movement pushed for unit prices to be posted so
consumers could compare different brands and sizes of products (Miyazaki, Sprott,
and Manning 2000). As a result, some states passed laws requiring retailers to display
unit prices. These laws varied widely with some giving retailers discretion over how
to display unit prices and other states specifying formatting requirements, such as
minimum font sizes and background colors to aid readability and clarity (Rose 2000).
Using annual regulatory updates published by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), I compile state-level regulations on unit pricing (NIST 2019).
For states with regulations, I cross-check NIST’s designation with state regulatory
codes and consult with state officials to ensure accuracy. Figure 1.3 shows that,
as of 2017, 16 states have regulations on the display of unit prices and 34 have no
regulations.17
17Summary statistics of these groups are reported in Appendix Table 1.22.
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Figure 1.3: Unit Price Regulations by State (2017)
Regulation Status Mand. Disp, Strict Mand. Disp Vol. Disp No Reg
Note: Using data from NIST Handbook 130, this figure plots whether or not a state has
regulations in place governing the display of unit prices as of August 1, 2017. “No Reg”
denotes that no regulations are in effect. “Vol. Disp” denotes states where regulations apply
if retailers choose to display unit prices. “Mand. Disp” denotes states where all retailers
must display unit prices. “Mand. Disp, Strict” denotes states where strict display formatting
requirements are in effect.
If these regulations affect household decisions, then bulk buying should differ
between states with and without these regulations. I first document how aggregate
patterns in bulk buying differ between states with different regulations and then I will
provide causal evidence for the impact of these regulations. I estimate the following
regression:
BulkShareit = α + β1Regit + γXit + λt + εit, (1.4)
where BulkShareit is the annual share of expenditures that were bulk purchases for
household i in year t. Regit is an indicator for whether or not unit-price regulations
are in effect. Xit controls for household characteristics. I control for year fixed effects
through λt. Standard errors are clustered by state because these regulations are at
the state level.
Since 2004, no state has modified its regulations on unit prices, so the coefficient
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on unit pricing regulation is identified from cross-sectional variation between states
that have regulations and those that do not.18,19 Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.2
reveal that bulk purchasing is 3.6 percentage points higher in states with unit price
regulations compared to states without unit price regulation, even after controlling
for household characteristics and year fixed effects.
Table 1.2: Unit Price Regulations and Bulk Buying
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regulation 0.035∗∗ 0.036∗∗
(0.017) (0.016)
Vol. Disp 0.050∗ 0.011
(0.027) (0.010)
Mand. Disp 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
Mand. Disp, Strict 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Avg Bulk 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.49
Demographics N Y Y Y
Omit California N N N Y
Observations 732,512 732,512 732,512 668,791
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.057 0.045 0.037
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Using Nielsen 2004–2017 Consumer Panel data combined with state-level regulations,
this table shows the results of estimating Equation 1.4. The dependent variable is the annual
share of bulk purchases made by households and the independent variables are either a
binary indicator of the presence or absence of regulation (Columns (1) and (2)) or an ordered
measure of regulatory stringency (Columns (3) and (4)). Column (4) omits California because
it is the only state that has voluntary unit price, but strict requirements on how unit prices
are displayed. Standard errors are clustered by state.
I then analyze these unit pricing regulations at a higher level of detail. State
regulations vary across two dimensions: Posting and Formatting. Table 1.3 shows
the breakdown of states along these dimensions. First, states can opt to have unit
18Because there is no time variation in regulations, I cannot include state fixed effects in the
estimation.
19In 2013, the District of Columbia passed a law requiring retailers to display unit prices, but no
households in my sample live in DC.
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price posting be voluntary (seven states) or mandatory (nine states). Second, states
can specify how unit prices are formatted when they are displayed.20 Formatting
regulations specify features including minimum font sizes, background colors, and
label positioning. With the exception of California, only states that mandate unit
price posting have formatting requirements. Excluding California, regulations are
naturally ordered: no regulation, voluntary posting, mandatory posting (no formatting
requirements), and mandatory posting (with formatting requirements).
Table 1.3: Unit Price Regulations by State
No Formatting Rules Strict Formatting Rules
Voluntary Arkansas Montana California
Posting Florida Nevada
Hawai’i West Virginia
Mandatory Maryland Vermont Connecticut New York
Posting New Hampshire Massachusetts Rhode Island
Oregon New Jersey
Note: Based on state regulatory codes, the above table reports whether unit price posting
is mandatory or voluntary for retailers and whether or not there are strict formatting
requirements on how unit prices should be displayed (minimum font size, color, etc.).
Columns (3) and (4) continue the earlier analysis, but leverage the stringency
of the regulations. Column (3) shows that mandatory posting is associated with
significantly higher bulk buying, but states with voluntary requirements may have
higher rates of bulk buying. However, as Table 1.3 shows, California is an outlier in
this regulatory environment because is the only state with the unique combination
of voluntary posting and strict formatting requirements. Because of this, I exclude
California and re-estimate the regression. Column (4) reveals that California is the
primary driver of this effect and states with voluntary posting do not have significantly
higher bulk purchasing. On the other hand, mandatory unit price posting is associated
with a 2.8–3.8 percentage point increase in bulk buying. The point estimates for bulk
buying in states with strict formatting requirements are lower than those in states
without formatting requirements, but these estimates are not significantly different
from each other. This pattern supports the intuition that standardized unit price
20All states with these regulations standardize how unit prices are to be calculated, which is what
makes the voluntary states different from states without regulations.
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presentation reduces cognitive costs, increases the salience of unit prices, and facilitates
comparisons for consumers.
This estimation provides strong evidence of a relationship between unit pricing
regulations and bulk purchasing. However, there is a risk of selection bias since these
regulations were primarily adopted in the Northeast and West Coast regions of the
United States. To provide causal evidence, I examine about 13,000 households that
move once during their tenure in the data. About 11% of these households move
between regulatory regimes while the remainder are either local moves or moves
that maintain their current regulatory regime. To estimate the effect of unit-price
regulations on these two groups of movers, I use a differences-in-differences specification:
BulkShareit = α + β1Regit + γXit + λi + λt + εit, (1.5)
where the variables are the same as in Equation (1.4), but I control for household
fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the household level.21 With this
specification, β1 is identified by changes in bulk purchases for households that move
from a state with unit-price regulations to a state without unit-price regulations (or
vice versa).22 Since the “direction” of a household’s move may matter (i.e., whether
they start in a state without regulations and move to a state with regulations or vice
versa), in subsequent specifications, I will account for the direction of the move.23
This specification relies on the assumption that households would have continued
buying in bulk like other households that moved, but did not change their regulatory
regime. To provide evidence supporting this “common trends” assumption, I plot an
event study by estimating a modified version of Equation (1.5):
BulkShareit = α +
∑
τ 6=−1
βτ1Y rit + γXit + λi + λt + εit, (1.6)
where Y r is a dummy for each year before or after a household moves to a state with
a different unit pricing regime. The reference group is t = −1 so all effects are relative
to the year before the household moves. Figure 1.4 plots the annual coefficients.
21Clustering at the state level does not affect the estimates.
22Projection weights are not used because the weights are not designed for this subsample of
movers.
23Appendix Table 1.23 reports summary statistics for various groups of movers. Groups are
relatively similar, but movers are slightly richer, older, more educated, and have fewer children.
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Law Status After Household Move● To Law To No Law
Note: Using 2004–2017 Nielsen Consumer Panel data, this figure plots the βt1 coefficients and
95% confidence intervals from Equation (1.6), which regresses household bulk purchasing on
dummies for years before and after a household moves to a state with a different unit pricing
regime than the state it moves from. The regression controls for household characteristics as
well as household and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
“To” reports estimates for households that move from a state without unit price regulations
to a state with unit price regulations. “Away” reports estimates for households that move
from a state with unit price regulations to a state without regulations.
Figure 1.4 shows that there are no significant pre-trends. Furthermore, households
decrease their bulk buying when they move from a state with unit-price regulations
to a state without unit-price regulations. On the other hand, households that move
from states without unit-price regulations to states with unit pricing regulations do
not significantly change their bulk buying.
Table 1.4 reports the results of estimating Equation (1.5). Columns (1) and (2)
show that a household’s bulk buying is about one percentage point higher when they
are in a state with unit price regulations, but this effect is only marginally significant.
This specification implicitly assumes that the effect of moving to a state with unit
price regulations will be the same as moving to a state without regulations (i.e., the
effect is symmetric). Column (3) treats the different directions of moving differently
and shows that moving to a state without unit price regulations significantly decreases
bulk buying by 1.4 percentage points while moving to a state with regulations does
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not significantly change bulk buying.
Table 1.4: Event Study of Movers to Different State Regulatory Regimes
All Movers No Law To Law Law To No Law
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regulation 0.008 0.009∗ 0.003 0.014∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Avg Bulk 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Household FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Demographics N Y Y Y
Observations 92,739 92,739 86,712 88,479
Adjusted R2 0.625 0.627 0.627 0.628
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Using 2004–2017 Nielsen Consumer Panel data and state-level regulations, this table
shows estimates of Equation 1.5 which regresses household bulk buying on unit price regulation
after controlling for household fixed effects. “Regulation” denotes the estimated effect of
moving from a state without regulation to a state with regulation. Columns (3) and (4)
only include one set of movers that switch regimes in each specification with the remaining
households that move, but do not switch regimes. Column (3) excludes households that
move to states without unit price regulations to restrict identification of the regulatory
effect to households moving to states with regulations. Column (4) excludes households that
move to states with unit price regulations to restrict identification of the regulatory effect
to households moving to states without regulations. Standard errors are clustered at the
household level.
The asymmetric effect of unit pricing indicates the importance of both cognitive
costs and consumer education. For households that move to states without regulation,
the negative coefficient suggests that cognitive costs are discouraging households from
buying in bulk. For households that move to states with regulation, they may not
know how to best use the information provided and therefore consumer education
may help them recognize the value of quantity discounts and buy in bulk more.
Unit pricing regulations are relatively simple to implement for both policymakers
and retailers. Retailers will bear some initial setup costs of redesigning their price
labels, but ongoing costs will likely be similar to current menu costs that firms bear.24
24In 1975, the Government Accountability Office (then the General Accounting Office) estimated
20
Adopting unit pricing policies (like those recommended by the National Conference
on Weights and Measures) would encourage bulk buying while imposing few costs.
These findings support the broader assertion that increasing price transparency allows
households to choose products that deliver more value.
Store Preferences
The second potential contributor to the bulk buying gap is store preferences; low-
income households may not live in areas where bulk sizes are available or may not
shop at stores that offer bulk sizes. In this subsection, I provide evidence that the
bulk buying gap persists within neighborhoods and within store types. Then, I show
that warehouse club entry increases bulk buying by 4.0–7.3%, but these increases hold
only for middle- and high-income households.
Inequality Within Markets and Retail Chains
If supply factors are the primary driver of the bulk buying gap, then the gap should
disappear when comparing households in the same neighborhood since they have the
same set of stores to choose from. I show that the bulk buying gap still persists within
ZIP codes. This remaining gap corresponds to the amount that cannot be explained
by differences in access, at least as approximated by geography.
Even within ZIP codes, there may be other factors affecting where households
shop, such as whether or not a household has a vehicle, access to public transit, or
a warehouse club membership. To account for possible differences, I examine how
much of the bulk buying gap persists within chains. This exercise assumes that within
a chain, households have access to the same assortment of goods (DellaVigna and
Gentzkow 2019). I also examine the bulk buying gap within store types (i.e., “channel”)
to account for the fact that bulk buying differences may primarily be between channels
(discount versus dollar) instead of between retailers within a channel (Walmart versus
that implementation and maintenance would cost about 0.1% of sales (General Accounting Office
1975). This was estimated before the adoption of bar codes and other efficiency-improving practices




I estimate within-ZIP and within-chain bulk buying gaps using a modified form of
Equation 1.2:
BulkShareimt = α +
∑
q
βqIncomeimt + γXimt + λmt + εimt, (1.7)
where Incomeimt is an indicator for the income bin of household i in market m in
year t. Ximt consists of household characteristics. For the analysis of bulk buying
within ZIP code, BulkShareimt is the share of bulk purchases made by household i
in ZIP code m in year t and λmt is a ZIP-year fixed effect. For the analysis of bulk
buying within retail chains, BulkShareimt is the share of bulk purchases made by
household i in retail chain m in year t and λmt is a retail chain-year fixed effect and/or
a channel-year fixed effect.
Figures 1.5a and 1.5b plot the income coefficients with and without fixed effects for
each regression. Adding ZIP-year fixed effects reduces the gap between the highest and
lowest income groups by 9% (from 10.5 percentage points to 9.6 percentage points).
Results are virtually unchanged if I use county-year fixed effects instead of ZIP-year
fixed effects. Using channel-year fixed effects reduces the bulk buying gap by a more
substantial 66% (from 7.4 percentage points to 2.5 percentage points). Adding retail
chain-year fixed effects on top of channel-year fixed effects does not significantly affect
the bulk buying gap. This implies that a large share of the bulk buying gap is related
to the types of stores households shop at, but not the specific chain they choose within
a particular store type.
Overall, within ZIP codes, the bulk buying gap between high- and low-income
households persists. However, within store type (or retail chain), the bulk buying gap
is substantially reduced. Two important conclusions can be drawn from these patterns.
First, in an accounting sense, the type of store a household shops at accounts for
two-thirds of the bulk buying gap. This is likely an overestimate of the contribution
of store preferences because those preferences may be driven by more fundamental
factors (e.g., high storage costs or budget constraints could prevent households from
shopping at warehouse clubs, as opposed to households having a low preference for
25Retailer names are only for expository purposes. Retailer identities are anonymized in the
Nielsen data.
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Type ● Channel + Retailer FE Channel FE Without FE
(b) Retailer / Channel FEs
Note: Using 2004–2017 Nielsen Consumer Panel data, panel (a) plots the income bin
coefficients from Equation (1.7), which regresses the share of annual purchases that were
bulk packages on household characteristics as well as a ZIP code-year fixed effect. Panel (b)
runs the same estimation, but with retailer-year and channel-year fixed effects (a “channel”
is a type of store). Nielsen projection weights are used to ensure national representativeness.
Households making $5–8k are the reference group.
warehouse clubs). Second, the bulk buying gap still persists within channels and retail
chains. These patterns suggest that where a household shops and what they choose
within a store are much more important than where a household is located. The next
section explores how store preferences are related to income and how warehouse clubs
affect bulk buying.
Store Preferences by Income
The previous section shows that while the bulk buying gap persists within ZIP codes,
it is narrower within store types and retail chains. In this section, I show that the
biggest shopping differences between income groups are related to warehouse clubs. I
then estimate the effect of warehouse club entry on bulk buying.
To demonstrate differences in store preference by household income, I examine
the relationship between where households shop and their income using the following
regression:
ChannelShareimt = α +
∑
q
βqIncomeimt + γXimt + λm + λt + εimt, (1.8)
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Type ● Dollar Store Grocery/Discount/Drug Store Warehouse Club
Note: Using 2004–2017 Nielsen Consumer Panel data, this figure plots the income bin
coefficients from Equation (1.8), which regresses the share of annual purchases at each store
type on household characteristics as well as year and market fixed effects. Nielsen projection
weights are used to ensure national representativeness. Households making $5–8k are the
reference group.
where ChannelShareimt is the share of annual spending that household i in market
m in year t made in a particular channel (grocery store, discount store, dollar store,
drug store, or warehouse club). Incomeimt is an indicator for a household’s income
bin. Ximt captures other household characteristics. Finally, market and year fixed
effects capture differences in spending shares across markets and over time.
Figure 1.6 reveals that while there are small differences in the share of annual
expenditures at grocery, drug, and discount stores, there are dramatic differences in
whether households shop at warehouse clubs or dollar stores: households making over
$100,000 spend about 13 percentage points more of their non-food expenditures at
warehouse clubs than households making under $25,000.
Because the biggest differences are in warehouse clubs and these stores almost
solely stock bulk sizes, I focus on how warehouse clubs affect bulk buying. The
following analysis of warehouse clubs uses data on over 1,400 warehouse club locations
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between 2004–2015.26 The first possibility is that high-income households shop at
warehouse clubs because they are closer. Table 1.5 shows that low-income households
are about 15 miles away from the nearest warehouse club compared to only 8 miles
away for high-income households.
Table 1.5: Average Distance to Warehouse Club by Income (Miles)
Household Income Mean SD 25th Pctile 75th Pctile
<25k 14.79 18.98 3.26 20.53
25-50k 12.79 17.51 3.03 15.94
50-100k 10.61 15.16 2.85 12.01
>100k 7.92 12.08 2.51 8.45
Note: Using Nielsen Consumer Panel data from 2004–2015 and warehouse location data, this
table reports the distance between ZIP code centroids of warehouse locations and household
locations. Nielsen projection weights are used to ensure national representativeness.
The ideal experiment would randomly assign warehouse clubs to neighborhoods
and then their effect on bulk buying could easily be calculated. Even though store
locations are not randomly assigned, within a household, it is exceedingly unlikely
that a warehouse club opening could be co-incident with a shift in bulk buying,
so any observed changes are likely causal. Leveraging the panel structure of the
Nielsen Consumer Panel, I estimate how a household’s bulk purchasing changes after
a warehouse club opens using the following equation:
BulkShareimt = α + βEntryimt + γXimt + λim + λt + εimt, (1.9)
where BulkShareimt is the share of bulk purchases made by household i in market m
in quarter t. Entryimt is an indicator for whether or not a warehouse club entered
within 15 miles of household i in quarter t.27,28 I include a household-market and
year-quarter fixed effects λ to ensure that β is identified by within-household changes
26Data provided by the authors of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Koustas (2017) and covers BJ’s,
Costco, and Sam’s Club.
27In cases where a household is located near multiple warehouse clubs, I use the earliest entry
date since the first warehouse club would generate the largest supply shock.
28According to the 2017 National Household Travel Survey, the average household traveled about
seven miles to buy goods, with low-income households traveling about one or two miles less than
higher-income households (Federal Highway Administration 2017). Allowing for the possibility that
households might travel farther to shop at a warehouse club, I use a cutoff of 15 miles. Appendix
Table 1.24 shows that this pattern is robust to other cutoffs.
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in bulk buying before and after a warehouse club opens instead of households that
may move to areas closer to warehouse clubs. X controls for possible demographic
changes within the household.
This specification relies on the assumption that households would have continued
buying in bulk like other households that did not experience a warehouse club entry.
To provide evidence supporting this “common trends” assumption, I plot an event
study by estimating a modified version of Equation 1.9, but replace the entry indicator
with dummies for each quarter pre- and post-entry:
BulkShareimt = α +
∑
q
βqQtrimt + γXimt + λim + λt + εimt, (1.10)
where Qtrimt is a dummy for each quarter prior to entry and after entry, with the
quarter immediately before entry (q = −1) as the reference group. Figure 1.7 plots the
quarterly coefficients and shows that for most income groups there are no significant
pre-trends. For households in the lowest income quartile, there is some evidence that
those that experienced a warehouse club entry buy in bulk more often than other
low-income households that do not experience an entry. After a warehouse club enters,
there are significant increases in bulk buying for middle- and high-income households
and these effects are persistent up to eight quarters after a warehouse club has opened.
Table 1.6 shows the regression results. Overall, households that experienced
a warehouse club entry increased their bulk purchasing by two percentage points.
However, when I interact household income with warehouse club entry, the increase in
bulk buying is due to changes for households making over $25,000 and is increasing
in income, with households making over $100,000 increasing their bulk buying by
3.5 percentage points. Households in the lowest quartile do not have any significant
change in their bulk buying. One likely reason that low-income households do not
change their bulk buying is that even after a warehouse club enters, households do
not purchase a membership (fees range from $45–$120 depending on the chain and
membership level). Other possible reasons are that low-income households do not have
access to transportation that can carry items home, do not have the space to store
the items, or even if they had a membership, they still would not purchase extremely
large sizes available at warehouse clubs due to budget constraints.29
29As an example, Philadelphia provides public transit access to a warehouse club. However,
26

























































































Note: This figure plots the quarterly coefficients from Equation (1.10)—the effects of
warehouse club entry on bulk purchasing of households before and after warehouse club
entry—using 2004–2015 household-by-quarter Nielsen Consumer Panel data. The regression
controls for household characteristics as well as household-ZIP code fixed effects. All
coefficients are relative to bulk purchasing in the quarter before entry (q = −1). Error bars
denote 95% confidence intervals.
This analysis estimates the intent to treat effect since not all households shop at
the entrant warehouse club after it opens. As a result, this is a conservative lower
bound on the actual treatment effect on households that shop at warehouse clubs.30
The effect is quite substantial even given how conservative it is.
To examine whether this change in bulk buying comes from households shopping
more at warehouse clubs, I estimate Equation 1.9 on different margins of bulk buying.
The increase in bulk buying after warehouse club entry could be coming from three
possible margins. First, households could increase their bulk buying at non-warehouse
club stores (intensive non-warehouse club margin). Second, households could increase
their bulk buying at warehouse club stores (intensive warehouse club margin). Third,
carrying club-sized items on a bus is infeasible for more than two or three items. A personal vehicle
would be necessary.
30Even though low-income households do not change their bulk buying, other research suggests
that they may be worse off because existing retailers are more likely to increase prices for storable
products as a competitive response (Bauner and Wang 2019).
27




Post-Entry : <25k 0.001
(0.008)
Post-Entry : 25-50k 0.019∗∗∗
(0.006)
Post-Entry : 50-100k 0.025∗∗∗
(0.005)
Post-Entry : >100k 0.035∗∗∗
(0.009)
Avg Bulk 0.48 0.48 0.48
Household-ZIP FE’s Y Y Y
Year-Quarter FE’s Y Y Y
Demographic Controls N Y Y
Observations 2,401,038 2,401,038 2,401,038
Adjusted R2 0.428 0.428 0.428
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: This table uses 2004–2015 Nielsen Consumer Panel data at the household-quarter
level. Coefficients are reported for Equation (1.9) which regresses households’ quarterly bulk
purchase shares on an indicator for warehouse club entry, household characteristics as well
as household-ZIP code and year-quarter fixed effects. Projection weights are not used.
households could increase their bulk buying by switching shopping to warehouse club
stores (extensive margin). The observations used in estimation are household-quarter
bulk shares at warehouse club and non-warehouse club stores.
Table 1.7 shows the regression results. Column (1) is estimated using quarterly
bulk buying shares at non-warehouse club stores as the dependent variable. After
warehouse club entry, there is no significant change in bulk buying at non-warehouse
club stores for any income group. Furthermore, the standard errors are quite small,
so if there were changes, they are minimal. Column (2) is estimated using quarterly
bulk buying shares at warehouse club stores as the dependent variable, which includes
many zeros because there are quarters where households do not shop at warehouse
club stores. For households that never shop at warehouse club stores, they have a
28
Table 1.7: Effect of Warehouse Club Entry on Bulk Buying Along Different Margins
Non-Club Club Club Intensive
(1) (2) (3)
Post-Entry 0.0001 0.075∗∗∗ −0.005
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Post-Entry : 25-50k −0.003 0.018∗∗∗ −0.003
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Post-Entry : 50-100k −0.001 0.009∗∗∗ 0.0005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Post-Entry : >100k −0.001 0.012∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Avg Bulk 0.4 0.27 0.97
Household-ZIP FE’s Y Y Y
Year-Quarter FE’s Y Y Y
Demographic Controls Y Y Y
Observations 2,401,038 2,401,038 661,240
Adjusted R2 0.254 0.567 0.193
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: This table uses 2004–2015 Nielsen Consumer Panel data at the household-quarter
level. Coefficients are reported for Equation (1.9) which regresses households’ quarterly bulk
purchase shares on an indicator for warehouse club entry, household characteristics as well as
household-ZIP code and year-quarter fixed effects. Column (1) uses bulk buying shares only
at non-warehouse club stores as the dependent variable. Column (2) uses bulk buying shares
at warehouse club stores (inclusive of zero spending quarters) as the dependent variable.
Column (3) uses bulk buying shares at warehouse club stores (excluding zero spending
quarters) as the dependent variable. Projection weights are not used.
string of zeroes. After warehouse club entry, quarterly bulk buying at warehouse clubs
increases by a statistically significant 7.5 percentage points and is higher for higher
income groups. This increase could be generated by households shopping more often
at warehouse clubs, and therefore increasing the number of quarters with non-zero
bulk spending at warehouse clubs. It could also be generated by households increasing
the share of bulk purchases they already make at warehouse clubs. Column (3) focuses
on only quarters with positive bulk shares at warehouse clubs and shows that there
are no significant changes in bulk buying, conditional on shopping at a warehouse
club, after a warehouse club enters. Therefore, the significant increase in Column
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(2) is generated by households switching to shopping more at warehouse clubs after
a warehouse club enters. Overall, warehouse club entry increases bulk buying by
encouraging households to make more shopping trips to warehouse clubs.
Budget Constraints
Budget constraints may be another contributing factor to the bulk buying gap.
Importantly, the necessary budget constraints must bind over short time periods (e.g.,
months) because over the course of a year, households spend more than they would
have for the same amount of goods if they had taken advantage of bulk discounts.
Such short-horizon budget constraints are most binding for the lowest income groups,
but are unlikely to bind for middle- and high-income groups.31
To test this explanation, I examine over-the-month changes in liquidity. Low-
income households are more likely to have higher liquidity at the start of the month
compared to the end of the month (Stephens Jr 2003; Orhun and Palazzolo 2019).
Consistent with this fact, the spending of low-income households tends to decline over
the course of the month while the spending of higher income groups is relatively flat
(Orhun and Palazzolo 2019).
I use within-household variation in the timing of purchases to estimate a differences-
in-differences model. This model tests the coincidence of changes to bulk buying with
times of the month when households may be liquidity constrained. This approach
is similar to Orhun and Palazzolo (2019). I use weekly bulk buying information to






βqw1 1{week = w}∗Inciw+β2Inciw+γXiw+λi+εiw, (1.11)
where BulkShareiw is the share of bulk purchases made by household i in week w.
1{week = w} is an indicator for the second, third, or last week of the month. Inciw
indicates the household’s income bin q. Xiw is the usual set of household characteristics
and λ is a household fixed effect. The results are reported in Table 1.8.
Overall, households making less than $25,000 decrease their bulk buying by a slight
0.2 to 0.4 percentage points during the third and fourth weeks of the month while
31Middle- and high-income households may still face monthly budget constraints, but grocery
spending is unlikely to be a major factor for all but the lowest-income households.
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Table 1.8: Over-the-Month Changes in Bulk Buying
(1) (2) (3)
Week 2 −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.001
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
Week 3 −0.002∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)




Week 2 : 25-50k −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Week 3 : 25-50k 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)




Week 2 : 50-100k −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Week 3 : 50-100k 0.002∗ 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001)




Week 2 : >100k 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Week 3 : >100k 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Week 4 : >100k 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Mean Bulk 0.46 0.46 0.46
Household FE’s Y Y Y
Demographics N N Y
Observations 2,854,905 2,854,905 2,854,905
Adjusted R2 0.402 0.402 0.404
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Using 2004–2017 Nielsen Consumer Panel data, this table displays the regression
coefficients from estimating Equation 1.11 which regresses a household’s weekly share of
bulk purchases of non-food products on the week of the month, income, and other household
characteristics and includes a households fixed effect.
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households making over $25,000 have no decline (and possibly a slight increase) in
their bulk buying during the third and fourth weeks of the month.
This analysis does not rule out the possibility of liquidity constraints contributing
to differences in bulk buying, but it does rule out that local changes in liquidity
significantly affect bulk buying. Liquidity shocks larger than intra-month paycheck
variation may be necessary to increase bulk buying, but more work would be necessary
to determine whether that is the case.32
Storage Costs
Storage costs are the fourth contributing factor that I examine. Intuitively, households
that buy in bulk need a place to store large packages, which could be in a basement,
pantry, or cabinets. Households without available storage space may want to save
money through quantity discounts, but choose not to because they have limited storage
space.
The ideal experiment would randomly assign households to various home sizes
and then observe their bulk purchasing behavior to identify storage costs. However,
exogenously changing a household’s living situation is infeasible. The next best option
is to test some intuitive implications of storage costs. First, while I cannot randomly
assign households to different home sizes, there are many households that move while
they are in the Nielsen panel. I observe whether households live in single-family homes
or apartments, which generates variation in available storage space. According to
the American Housing Survey, the median single-family home is about twice as large
as the median apartment. Since at least 1999, new single-family homes have had a
median size of 2,000–2,400 square feet while the median apartment is only 1,000–1,100
square feet and this holds true within Census regions as well. Therefore, households
that move into single-family homes are likely to have more available storage space and
this will increase their willingness to buy in bulk.
To test this hypothesis, I estimate how bulk buying changes when households
32Another approach could leverage information on when households get paid. Households that get
paid weekly or bi-weekly may not have such large monthly fluctuations over the course of the month
compared to households that get paid monthly.
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change their housing size, by estimating Equation 1.12:
BulkShareit = α + βHouseit + γXit + λi + λt + εit, (1.12)
where Houseit is a dummy for whether a household i lives in a single-family house in
year t (apartments are the reference group). Xit controls for changes in other household
characteristics. Household and year fixed effects, λ, ensure that β is identified off of
within-household changes in housing. Standard errors are clustered at the household
level. Table 1.9 shows that bulk buying is one percentage point higher when households
are in single-family homes compared to when they are in apartments.
Table 1.9: Relationship Between Bulk Buying and Housing Changes
(1) (2) (3)
Single-Family Home 0.012∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Avg Bulk 0.5 0.5 0.5
Market FE’s Y Y Y
Year FE’s Y Y Y
Demographics N Y Y
Future Income N N Y
Observations 731,762 731,762 566,535
Adjusted R2 0.688 0.688 0.691
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Using Nielsen 2004–2017 Consumer Panel data, this table shows the results of
estimating Equation 1.12. The dependent variable is the annual share of bulk purchases made
by households and the independent variables are housing and other household characteristics.
Estimation includes household, market, and year fixed effects. “Future Income” denotes a
household’s income one year in the future. Standard errors are clustered by household.
Column (1) shows that bulk buying is 1.2 percentage points higher when a household
lives in a single-family home. However, since housing changes can be due to other
within-household shifts, such as marriage or having children, column (2) also controls
for other within-household demographic changes. The increase in bulk buying is
slightly reduced, but there is still an increase when households move into larger spaces.
Finally, households may move into larger housing if they expect to earn more and
this expectation of future income may also increase their bulk buying. Column (3)
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also includes a household’s one-year-ahead income and there is no change to the bulk
buying increase after a household moves into a single-family home. This result is not
causal, but it supports the intuition that when households have more storage space,
they are more able to buy in bulk.
Another implication of storage costs is that products with a smaller “footprint”
(physical volume) have lower storage costs. Therefore, if storage costs influence bulk
buying, there should be a smaller gap in bulk buying for smaller products (like plastic
wrap) relative to large, cumbersome products (like paper towels and toilet paper). To
test this implication, I estimate a modified form of Equation 1.3 that relates average
package sizes with household income:
ln(AvgSize)imt = α +
∑
q
βqIncomeimt + γXimt + λm + λt + εimt,
where AvgSizeimt is the average package size purchased by household i in market m
in year t. Incomeimt consists of dummies for each income quantile q. Ximt consists of
household characteristics. Year and market fixed effects are captured by λ.
Figure 1.8 plots the income coefficients from the regression for all non-food grocery
categories. I have highlighted some popular product categories. The bulk buying gap
is largest for the physically biggest products such as paper towels and toilet paper
while the gap is smaller for less bulky items such as liquid detergent and diapers.
Overall, this pattern supports the hypothesis that storage costs contribute to the
bulk buying gap, but the persistence of the gap even for smaller products suggests
that other factors are at play. This graph should also be interpreted with caution
because not all products are commonly consumed across all income groups. The two
largest gaps are in pool cleaning supplies and paper bags, which are more likely to
be purchased by high-income households than low-income households, regardless of
package size.33
Overall, these results provide evidence that storage costs and bulk buying are
related. When households move to larger homes (relative to apartments), they buy
more in bulk. Similarly, product categories with larger physical footprints exhibit
larger bulk buying gaps relative to product categories with smaller footprints. To more
33The gap in paper bag purchases may be related to preferences in that high-income households
may use paper bags for lunches while lower-income households use a lunchbox or plastic bags.
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Household Income 25−50k 50−100k >100k
Note: Using 2004–2017 Nielsen Consumer Panel data, this figure plot the β coefficients from
Equation (1.3), which regresses average package size purchased on household income. The
regression controls for household characteristics as well as market and year fixed effects.




The previous analyses show that cognitive costs and storage costs affect the bulk buying
decision. To decompose the contribution of each factor, I embed them into a discrete
choice model of the household’s purchase decision. The ideal setting would include
a homogeneous good where demand is uncorrelated with income. Given substantial
price, package size, and regulatory variation, differences in large and small purchases
between households would identify storage costs and differences in buying between
regulatory regimes would identify cognitive costs. This setting is approximated by
one where products have limited dimensions of differentiation and storage costs can
be separately identified from demand.
A discrete choice model of toilet paper purchases closely approximates this ideal
setting. Toilet paper is an excellent product for this analysis because it is a necessity
item with easily observable dimensions of differentiation, namely price, quality, quantity,
and package size. It is offered in a wide range of package sizes and stores stock numerous
brands and sizes (grocery and mass merchandise stores usually stock 35–40 unique
brand-sizes). The top five brands and private-label store brands account for 86%
of sales. I focus on the most common package sizes, which range from 4- to 24-roll
packages. I define a product as a unique brand-size combination.34 Additionally,
underlying toilet paper consumption is primarily a function of household composition
and age, not income.35 High-income households consume a similar amount as low-
income households but make fewer purchases (Orhun and Palazzolo 2019). Finally,
toilet paper cannot be easily substituted for another product nor can it be obtained
through home production.36
The biggest identification challenge is separately identifying storage costs from
underlying demand (i.e., households may buy large quantities because they have
high consumption or because they have low storage costs). To separate storage
34Specifically, this is a unique brand-roll count-sheet count because packages can differ in their
“concentration” due to “double,” “mega,” and “super mega” rolls.
35A 100-fold cross-validated elastic net regression of annual purchases on household characteristics
rules out income as significantly predictive. See Appendix 1.A for details.
36While a bidet is a possible alternative, this is more likely a lifestyle choice instead of a situation
where households switch between toilet paper and bidets. Furthermore, in the United States, 98%
of households report that they use toilet paper (the remainder either said no or did not respond)
(Statista 2019).
36
costs from demand, I use variation induced by differences in product “concentration,”
which I define as the yield of the product per unit volume. Product concentration
breaks the direct link between volume and consumption. In the detergent category,
a product’s yield is the number of washes it will supply. A concentrated detergent
can wash the same number of loads but requires a smaller fluid volume than diluted
detergent. Therefore, given the same number of washes, households that choose
concentrated detergent must have higher storage costs than those choosing diluted
detergent, assuming quality does not differ based on concentration.
The same reasoning holds true for toilet paper. Households do not demand a
particular number of rolls (the primary determinant of package size), but choose how
long they want their supply to last (i.e., purchase enough to last for two weeks, a
month, two months, etc.).37 Toilet paper comes in a variety of concentrations with
“mega” rolls being more concentrated than “regular” rolls. Therefore, a household that
purchases 24 “regular” rolls has the same demand for toilet paper as a household that
purchases six “mega” rolls, but the former household has lower storage costs since they
can store the bigger package.
To illustrate the varying concentrations of toilet paper, Figure 1.9 plots the
distribution of quantity (measured in number of days the supply will last for a single
person) against package sizes (measured in rolls) for toilet paper products in the
Nielsen data. As expected, there is an increasing relationship between how long the
package will last and the number of rolls in a package, but there is substantial variation
within packages containing the same number of rolls. The dashed lines denote the
25th and 75th percentiles of the average days’ supply purchased by households. A
wide range of package sizes fall within this range for each brand.38 For example, a
household demanding a 60-day supply of Charmin could purchase a package containing
anywhere from 8 to 24 rolls. This overlap generates the necessary variation to separate
storage costs from underlying demand.
37According to a 2007 Charmin survey, the average person uses 57 sheets per day. I assume this
consumption rate when computing how long a product will last (Jaffe 2007).
38Scott toilet paper is an exception because it does not offer different roll types. All rolls have
1000 sheets.
37
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Note: Using 2004–2017 Nielsen Consumer Panel data, this figure plots the package sizes
and quantities of the top five toilet paper brands and private-label products. The y-axis
represents the number of toilet paper rolls contained in a package while the x-axis represents
the number of days a product will last a single person household assuming a consumption
rate of 57 two-ply sheets per day (Jaffe 2007). Noise is added vertically to better illustrate the
number of products available within package sizes since roll counts are discrete. Dashed lines
indicate the 25th and 75th percentiles of the average days’ supply purchased by households.
Model Setup
I model a household’s purchase decision using a static discrete choice framework.
When making a purchase, households consider the price, unit price, quality, quantity,
and size of each package and choose the package that maximizes their utility. These
features are captured in the household i’s indirect utility function:
Uijt =β1Pricejt + β2UnitPricejt + β3UnitPricejt ×Regi+ (1.13)
β4 log(Daysj) + β5BigPackj + β6BigPackj ×Housei+
β7SmallPackj + β8SmallPackj ×Housei + θb(j) + εijt,
where Pricejt is the total price of product j at time t. Regi is an indicator for
whether unit price regulations are in effect for household i. Daysj is the number of
days the package will last (a function of the number of total sheets in the package and
38
the number of people in the household). UnitPricejt is the per-day, per-person price
of the package, since the yield of a package is how many days it will last. BigPackj
is a dummy for the package having more than 12 rolls and SmallPackj is a dummy
for less than 12 rolls.39 Housei is an indicator for whether the household lives in a
single-family home, with the alternative being an apartment. Finally, θb(j) is a brand
fixed effect. Brand fixed effects capture quality differences between products. I assume
εijt is iid Type 1 extreme value.
This simple model incorporates the key features necessary to quantify the contri-
bution of cognitive and storage costs to the bulk-buying gap. Preferences for package
size (a measure of storage costs) are captured by β5, β6, β7, and β8, while the effect of
displaying per-unit prices is captured by β3.
The price coefficient is identified using price variation across shopping trips due to
shopping at different stores or sales. The size coefficient is identified by variation in
the product “concentration” as illustrated in Figure 1.9. That is, given their preferred
days’ supply (x-value), some households choose large packages and some choose small
packages (y-value).
Given these assumptions and the structure of the error term, the probability that
















where y indicates whether household i chose product j on shopping trip t. The
preference parameters β can then be estimated using maximum likelihood.
Random Coefficients Estimation
The logit model outlined above provides an important starting point, but it cannot
capture possible variation in tastes between households. Households may weigh unit
39Households bunch at 12-roll packages, so this allows for different package preferences around
this bunching point.
39
prices or package sizes differently based on unobserved factors outside of whether they
live in a single-family home or what their regulatory environment is. If this unobserved
variation is significant, then errors will be correlated and the estimates from the logit
model will be biased.
Furthermore, the Nielsen data has a panel structure and purchases made by the
same household are likely to be correlated. The logit specification cannot accommodate
kind of correlation, but a random-coefficients specification can. I assume that the unit
price, log days’ supply, and package size (large and small) coefficients are normally
distributed and allow for them to be correlated. I estimate the model using simulated
maximum likelihood.40 To increase accuracy and reduce computational burden, I use
pseudo-random Halton draws in the estimation procedure (Hensher and Greene 2003).
1.6 Estimation Results
I estimate this model separately for each income quartile using household purchases
from 2016. I observe about 45,500 toilet paper purchases across about 14,800 house-
holds at grocery stores and mass merchandisers.
Conditional Logit
Table 1.10 reports model estimates for the conditional logit specification.
The estimation results show that both the price and unit price coefficients are
negative, implying that all else equal, households prefer lower prices. Lower income
households are more price sensitive than high-income households. The interaction
terms reveal that when unit prices are posted, all households are more sensitive to
unit prices. This pattern supports the assertion that households respond to the
provision of new price information. All households prefer to have more days’ supply
of toilet paper compared to less. In terms of storage costs, all households have a
similar preference against large sizes and, with the exception of the highest-income
households, this preference is not significantly different based on their housing type.
The highest-income households that live in single-family homes have a much smaller
40I use the mlogit package which implements Ken Train’s Matlab code in R (Revelt and Train
1998).
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Table 1.10: Multinomial Logit Estimation Results (2016)
<25k 25-50k 50-100k >100k
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Price −0.230∗∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗ −0.205∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Unit Price −2.173∗∗∗ −1.919∗∗∗ −1.946∗∗∗ −1.902∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.085) (0.068) (0.103)
. : Reg −0.585∗∗ −1.145∗∗∗ −0.653∗∗∗ −0.247∗∗
(0.235) (0.119) (0.083) (0.104)
Log(Days) 0.641∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.031) (0.029) (0.048)
Large Size −0.516∗∗∗ −0.577∗∗∗ −0.336∗∗∗ −0.541∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.070) (0.067) (0.126)
. : Home 0.133 0.075 −0.029 0.298∗∗
(0.113) (0.078) (0.072) (0.129)
Small Size −0.259∗∗∗ −0.314∗∗∗ −0.324∗∗∗ −0.481∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.044) (0.048) (0.091)
. : Home −0.188∗∗∗ −0.090∗ −0.162∗∗∗ −0.056
(0.065) (0.047) (0.049) (0.093)
Brand FE’s Y Y Y Y
Observations 4,968 12,950 17,875 7,942
Log Likelihood −15,858.260 −40,901.380 −56,134.410 −24,815.100
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Using 2016 Nielsen Consumer Panel and Retail Scanner data, this table presents MLE
estimates from Equation 1.13. “Total Price” denotes the total price of the package while“unit
price” is the price per day that the package will last (assuming constant consumption of 57
sheets per day (Jaffe 2007)).“Reg” indicates whether unit price regulations are in effect.“Large”
indicates packages that are larger than 12 rolls and“small” indicates packages that are smaller
than 12 rolls. A 12-roll package is the reference group.“House” indicates if the household
lives in a single-family home (reference group is an apartment).
41



























Note: Using 2016 Nielsen Consumer Panel and Retail Scanner data, this figure plots the
distribution of price elasticities resulting from the estimation of Equation 1.13.
preference against large packages than other income groups. On the other hand, all
households also dislike small packages. Under a pure storage costs story, the small
packages would have been expected to have a positive sign for low-income households.
However, as mentioned in the model specification section, there is bunching at 12-roll
packages across households of all types, so this negative sign on the small size is likely
a result of that bunching.
Figure 1.10 plots the distribution of own-price elasticities for each product. The
majority of elasticities fall between -1.2 and -3.9 with poorer households having slightly
larger elasticities (in magnitude).41
These results support my earlier findings that unit price regulations affect a
household’s bulk buying decision and that high-income households have lower storage
41Table 4 of Cohen (2008) reports elasticities ranging from -1.94 to -2.54 for paper towels. My
estimates cover this range, but are generally much lower with a large mass between -1.2 and -2.0.
Demand for toilet paper is likely less elastic than paper towels since cloth kitchen towels or paper
napkins can substitute for paper towels. Toilet paper does not have any similar, readily available,
substitutes.
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costs. In the counterfactuals, I predict how the bulk buying gap changes in response
to regulatory changes and reductions in storage costs.
Model Fit
In order to examine how well the model fits the data, I determine if it reasonably
predicts the amount of toilet paper that households purchase. To calculate this, I
compute the predicted market share for each product and then calculate the expected
days’ supply purchased based on those market shares. Table 1.11 compares the overall
model predictions to the actual data. The model fits the data quite well, even given
its parsimony. It slightly over-predicts purchase amounts, but this is primarily because
it does not capture some products that are disproportionately popular (or unpopular)
relative to what would be expected based on their characteristics. For example, a
particular Charmin 6-pack has an 8–10% share for each income group, but based on
its characteristics, the model only predicts a 6–7% share. Replacing the brand fixed
effect with a product fixed effect would ensure a better fit, but at the cost of reducing
the interpretability and intuition of the model. I opt to maintain the parsimony and
interpretability of the model and simulate counterfactuals using this specification.






Note: Using 2016 Nielsen Consumer Panel and Retail Scanner data, this table compares the
average days’ supply of toilet paper purchased in the data with the predicted purchase from
the model. I assume an average daily consumption rate of 57 two-ply sheets per day (Jaffe
2007).
Random Coefficients
Table 1.12 reports model estimates for the random coefficients specification.
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Table 1.12: Random Coefficient Estimation Results (2016)
<25k 25-50k 50-100k >100k
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Price −0.300∗∗∗ −0.287∗∗∗ −0.284∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Unit Price −4.114∗∗∗ −2.642∗∗∗ −2.969∗∗∗ −3.243∗∗∗
(0.290) (0.124) (0.105) (0.155)
. : Reg −1.914∗∗∗ −1.759∗∗∗ −0.819∗∗∗ −0.503∗∗∗
(0.330) (0.161) (0.123) (0.149)
Log(Days) 1.146∗∗∗ 1.381∗∗∗ 1.452∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.050) (0.047) (0.071)
Large Size −1.654∗∗∗ −1.194∗∗∗ −1.288∗∗∗ −1.104∗∗∗
(0.174) (0.096) (0.098) (0.181)
. : Home 0.273∗ 0.101 −0.016 0.422∗∗
(0.147) (0.097) (0.093) (0.179)
Small Size −0.437∗∗∗ −0.345∗∗∗ −0.504∗∗∗ −0.807∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.062) (0.066) (0.139)
. : Home −0.173∗ −0.241∗∗∗ −0.221∗∗∗ −0.202
(0.095) (0.067) (0.069) (0.140)
σunitPrice 6.009∗∗∗ 4.973∗∗∗ 4.791∗∗∗ 3.849∗∗∗
(0.241) (0.116) (0.092) (0.113)
σlog(Days) 1.620∗∗∗ 1.499∗∗∗ 1.812∗∗∗ 1.651∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.039) (0.035) (0.056)
σLarge 1.847∗∗∗ 1.327∗∗∗ 1.647∗∗∗ 1.846∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.073) (0.065) (0.085)
σSmall 2.111∗∗∗ 2.181∗∗∗ 2.011∗∗∗ 2.353∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.048) (0.042) (0.067)
Brand FE’s Y Y Y Y
Observations 4,968 12,950 17,875 7,942
Log Likelihood −14,502.240 −37,679.860 −51,245.220 −22,705.370
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Using 2016 Nielsen Consumer Panel and Retail Scanner data, this table presents MLE
estimates from Equation 1.13. “Total Price” denotes the total price of the package while
“unit price” is the price per day that the package will last (assuming constant consumption of
57 sheets per day (Jaffe 2007)). “Reg” indicates whether unit price regulations are in effect.
“Large” indicates packages that are larger than 12 rolls and “small” indicates packages that
are smaller than 12 rolls. A 12-roll package is the reference group. “House” indicates if the
household lives in a single-family home (reference group is an apartment).
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The random coefficients estimates show the same qualitative patterns as the
conditional logit model. However, there are some notable differences. Each of the
random coefficients displays substantial heterogeneity.42 Lower income households
are more price sensitive than high-income households. Furthermore, low-income
households have a wider range of sensitivities than higher-income households, as
implied by the standard deviations of the unit price coefficient. The regulation and
package size coefficients reveal that lower income households are more responsive to
unit prices when they are posted and have more severe storage costs.
Figure 1.11 plots the distribution of own-price elasticities for each product using
the random coefficients estimates. These are calculated by increasing the price (and
the corresponding unit price) of a product by 1% and simulating the new market shares
for each product. The percent change in the market shares for the product whose
price changed is the own-price elasticity. The majority of elasticities fall between -1.7
and -5.1 with poorer households having larger elasticities (in magnitude).
Model Fit
I examine model fit similarly to the conditional logit model. However, since coefficients








I use simulation to approximate the integral by taking 1,000 draws from the joint
distribution of β. Table 1.13 compares the overall model predictions to the actual data.
The model over-predicts the amount purchased across all households, compared to the
conditional logit model, but this is primarily because it over-predicts the purchases of
particularly large generic packages. For example, a particular generic 12-pack has a
1–2% share for each income group, but based on its characteristics, the model predicts
a 3–5% share. The model assumes that all generic brands are equal, but in reality, it
may be the case that generic brands differ based on the retailer that sells them. This
additional dimension of heterogeneity could be captured by more granularly defining
brands by the retailer that sells them.
42Since each random coefficient was assumed to be normally distributed, some households may
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Note: Using 2016 Nielsen Consumer Panel and Retail Scanner data, this figure plots the
distribution of price elasticities resulting from the estimation of Equation 1.13, using random
coefficients.






Note: Using 2016 Nielsen Consumer Panel and Retail Scanner data, this table compares the
average days’ supply of toilet paper purchased in the data with the predicted purchase from




Using the parameter estimates from the previous section, I predict how households
respond to lower storage costs and universal unit price regulation. For these coun-
terfactual exercises, I compare all counterfactual results to a “base case” of predicted
purchases given their current shopping environment. I consider two counterfactual
scenarios:
1. Unit-Price Regulation: Unit-price regulations are adopted everywhere.
2. Reduced Storage Costs: All households have the same storage costs (i.e.,
size preferences) as high-income households.
For the unit-price regulation scenario, I set each household’s unit price coefficient
equal to the sum of its coefficient and the regulation interaction term. For households
making under $25,000, their unit price coefficient becomes −2.173− 0.585 = −2.758.
For the reduced storage cost scenario, I set all size coefficients equal to the coefficients
for households making over $100,000.
Table 1.14 reports the counterfactual predictions for both the conditional logit (top
panel) and the random coefficients model (bottom panel). I will discuss the conditional
logit results first. When unit price regulations are adopted, all households increase
their purchase quantity, with middle-income groups increasing the most. Compared to
the original days’ supply purchased by high-income households, low-income households
close the gap by 16% from 5.05 days’ supply to 4.25 days’ supply after unit price
regulations are universally adopted. Equalizing storage costs reduces the gap by
another 1.51 days’ supply, an additional 30% of the gap. After making these two
changes, all but the lowest-income households buy almost the same amount as the
highest-income households. The remaining difference is due to brand preferences,
particularly because low-income households are more willing to buy generic brands
and less willing to by premium brands.
The random coefficient counterfactuals, while overpredicting the average days’
supply purchased, predicts a gap of 4.26 days’ supply between high- and low-income
have a non-intuitive valuation for product attributes, such as a positive valuation for unit price. Sign
restrictions can be imposed by assuming alternative distributions, such as a log-normal distribution.
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Table 1.14: Bulk Purchasing Counterfactual Simulation Results
Conditional Logit
Income Base + Unit Price Regs + Rich Storage
<25k 49.09 49.89 51.40
25-50k 49.45 51.40 53.88
50-100k 52.34 53.69 54.11
>100k 54.14 54.72 54.72
Random Coefficients
Income Base + Unit Price Regs + Rich Storage
<25k 50.67 52.67 56.86
25-50k 52.45 55.23 58.11
50-100k 54.48 55.91 58.47
>100k 54.93 55.83 55.83
Note: This table reports predicted package quantities purchased by households using model
estimates of Equation (1.13). Units are number of days the chosen package will last assuming
average daily consumption rate of 57 two-ply sheets (Jaffe 2007). The “Unit Price Regs”
scenario imposes unit price regulations everywhere. The “Rich Storage” scenario imposes
that all households have the same preferences for “large” and “small” packages as households
making over $100k. Scenarios are cumulative.
households. After universally adopting unit price regulations, all households increase
their purchasing, but the gap between high- and low-income households shrinks to 3.16
days’ supply. Equalizing storage costs actually reverses the gap with the lowest income
households buying 1.03 days’ supply more than high-income households. This dramatic
increase is driven by the fact that middle- and low-income households continue to be
highly price-sensitive and have a stronger preference for large quantities.
These counterfactuals support the main findings from Section 1.4 which showed
that unit price regulations increase bulk buying and that storage costs are a substantial
factor preventing households from buying in bulk. Since the earlier sections examined
bulk purchasing across all non-food products, I repeat the earlier analysis on mover
households specifically for toilet paper purchases. I estimate a modified version of
Equation 1.5 which replaces share of bulk purchases with log days’ supply of toilet
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paper:
Log(DaysSupply)it = α+ β1Regit+ β2SingleFamilyit+ γXit+ λi+ λt+ εit, (1.17)
Table 1.15 shows that households increase the days’ supply purchased by 3.5% when
unit prices are posted and by 2.6% when they move into a single-family home. The
model predictions are in line with these changes. The conditional logit model predicts
that purchasing increases by 1.1–3.9% when unit prices are posted (compared to
3.5% above) and by 0.8–4.8% when storage costs are reduced (compared to 2.6%
above). The random coefficients model predicts that purchasing increases by 1.6–5.3%
when unit prices are posted (compared to 3.5% above) and by 4.6–8.0% when storage
costs are reduced (compared to 2.6% above). The reduced-form estimates and model
predictions line up quite well with regards to posting unit prices. However, there are
some differences between the two types of estimates with respect to storage costs.
Part of this difference may be because home type (apartment or single-family home)
does not capture true storage costs while the random coefficients model offers more
flexibility to capture heterogeneity between households even with the same type of
housing. For example, the presence of a basement, garage, or even the number of
bathrooms may all influence the storage costs for toilet paper, but those are all
differences that can exist within single-family homes.
Overall, reducing cognitive costs and increasing the salience of unit prices helps
households make better value decisions, and generate a strong boost to bulk buying.
Adopting unit price regulations are a relatively straightforward policy approach to
encourage bulk buying, especially compared to the challenge of feasibly reducing
storage costs for low-income households.
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Household FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y
Demographics N Y
Observations 4,553,957 4,553,957
Adjusted R2 0.507 0.508
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Using 2004–2017 Nielsen Consumer Panel data and state-level regulations, this
table shows estimates of Equation 1.5 which regresses household bulk buying on unit price
regulation after controlling for household fixed effects and changes in household characteristics.
“Regulation” denotes the estimated effect of moving from a state without regulation to a
state with regulation. “Single-Family Home” indicates that household lives in a single-family
home with the reference category being an apartment. Standard errors are clustered at the
household level.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper documents the new fact that low-income households are less likely to
take advantage of quantity discounts relative to high-income households. This gap
is especially large for storable, necessity items like toilet paper and paper towels. If
low-income households bought in bulk like high-income households, they could save
5% on grocery items, saving an aggregate of $5.4 billion annually. I provide evidence
that cognitive costs, store preferences, budget constraints, and storage costs contribute
to this gap.
By using state-level variation in whether or not retailers have to display unit prices,
I find that displaying unit prices reduces cognitive costs and increases bulk buying.
Then, I show that where a household shops accounts for a large portion of this disparity
and that warehouse clubs increase bulk buying, but only for middle- and high-income
households. Low-income households are unlikely to shop at warehouse clubs, even if
they are nearby. Next, I demonstrate that low-income households slightly decrease
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bulk buying towards the end of the month, when budgets are tighter. Finally, I show
that households increase bulk buying when they move to larger housing, supporting
the fact that storage costs also influence the bulk buying decision.
Combining these features into a discrete choice model of toilet paper purchases, I
predict how households’ bulk purchasing changes if unit-price regulations are adopted
universally and if storage costs are reduced. I find that posting unit prices closes
the bulk buying gap by 26% and reducing storage costs completely closes the gap
with middle- and low-income households buying larger quantities than high-income
households.
This paper is one of the first to focus on consumer’s take-up of quantity discounts
and explore the factors that contribute to this decision. It provides evidence that
cognitive costs, store preferences, budget constraints, and storage costs affect a house-
hold’s bulk buying decision. These differences have substantial financial consequences
for the poorest households and are likely to generate systematic underestimates of
consumption inequality if quantity discounts offset quality differences between prod-
ucts. Additionally, if the prices of large and small packages evolve differently, then
households may experience substantial changes in their buying power. Future work will
determine the extent to which inequality and inflation measures are underestimated
because of quantity discounts.
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The Nielsen Consumer Panel consists of about 40,000–60,000 US households that
provide information on their shopping purchases using in-home scanners or Nielsen’s
mobile app. Panelists are geographically dispersed and demographically balanced.
Households are recruited based on key demographic characteristics, primarily household
size, income, age, education, presence of children, race, ethnicity, and occupation. To
generate national averages, Nielsen assigns each household a projection factor.
Households are recruited through direct mail and online invitations. To incentivize
households to remain in the panel, Nielsen provides monthly prize drawings, sweep-
stakes, points, and regular communication and support to panelists. Nielsen tries to
ensure that incentive methods are non-biasing and regularly tests for its correlation
with retention rates. To ensure data quality, Nielsen filters out any households that
are poor reporters and do not meet minimum spending thresholds based on their
household size. All households in the sample meet this threshold for the full year.
Demographic variables are recorded and updated annually. For my analysis, I
collapse some of the demographic variables into more aggregate categories. Household
composition measures the number adults and children residing in the home. Marital
status is an indicator for whether the head of household is married or not (I do
not distinguish between single, divorced, or widowed). Education is an indicator for
whether at least one head of household completed college. Housing variables indicate
whether a household lives in a single-family home, and apartment, or a mobile home.
Finally, age is the age of the head of household. In the case of two heads, I average
the two ages.
To construct my analysis sample, I remove any households where the head of
household is a student or a member of the military because these households likely
have different living arrangements that are not representative of a typical household’s
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decision (i.e. on campus housing or barracks are different than traditional homes and
apartments). I drop any households living in mobile homes as well because this type
of housing could include a wide range of house types including RVs and manufactured
homes. I also remove any households making less that $5,000 and those that could
not be geocoded based on their ZIP code.43 Finally, some households were dropped
because they could not be matched to tract-level vehicle access data.44 Table 1.16
reports how many households were removed based on this cleaning procedure.
Table 1.16: Homescan Sample Construction
Step HH
Starting HH: 178, 232
Exclude military and students: 175, 102
Exclude Households under 5k: 174, 106
Exclude Mobile Homes: 167, 065
Drop ZIPs Not Geocoded: 166, 366
Cannot Be Matched to Car Access: 166, 164
Note: Using 2004–2017 Nielsen Consumer Panel data, this table reports the number of unique
households in the sample after each step of data refinement.
In the purchase data, I exclude alcohol, tobacco, pet items, health and beauty
items, general merchandise, “magnet,” and “deferred” product categories from my
analysis. Alcohol and tobacco are excluded because of their addictive qualities, which
may induce peculiar purchase patterns. For example, a smoker may choose to only
buy one pack of cigarettes with the intention of quitting even though a full carton
may deliver a better value. Pet items are excluded to focus on products intended
for human consumption. I exclude health and beauty items and general merchandise
because products such as trash cans, printers, eye shadow, and antacids are unlikely
to be bought in bulk or have irregular consumption patterns. “Deferred” categories
are categories that Nielsen has stopped tracking, so to maintain a consistent sample
43I use the 2017 Census Gazetteer to assign ZIP codes to the latitude and longitude of their
population-weighted centroid
44Vehicle access data comes from the 2009–2013 American Community Survey, which asks how
individuals get to work. There is limited variation in this measure since most respondents have
vehicle access. For context, only 4% of Nielsen households live in Census tracts less than 90% access
to cars.
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of products, these are excluded from my analysis. Finally, “magnet” purchases are
items which do not have a UPC code, such as fresh fruits and vegetables, deli counter
items, or bakery items. Because these items are only recorded for a subset of Nielsen
households and are not standardized, I also exclude them from my analysis. This
process leaves me with 721 unique product categories. Because this paper focuses on
bulk purchases, I also exclude 28 categories that have five or fewer sizes across all
possible products.45 Overall, the products analyzed are common household staples
including almost all food categories, basic toiletry items, and non-food essentials like
toilet paper, soaps/detergents, and diapers. See Table 1.17 for summary statistics of
the top 20 product categories by annual spending.
To compare sizes across different product categories, I assign each product to its
quintile in the size distribution for that product category. I assign quintiles based
upon the sample quintiles of product sizes to ensure that each quintile has 20% of
available products in its support. An alternative strategy would assign quintiles
based on cutting the range of product sizes into equal intervals. However, in some
product categories, this risks generating quintiles with sparse support when there is
an especially large package available. As an example, consider eggs. Most packages
contain 6, 12, or 18 eggs, but there are some products that offer up to 15-dozen eggs
(180 eggs). Generating quintiles by cutting the available range into equal intervals
would generate quintiles of 1-36, 37-72, 73-108, 109-144, 145-180 which would assign
almost all packages to the first quintile and the fifth quintile. Using the sample
quintiles generates a more even distribution ensuring better support of each quintile.
For products with a narrow range of sizes that fall in multiple quintiles, I assign the
product to the minimum quintile. For example, over 60% of egg products are dozens,
which covers three quintiles. I assign all products with 12 or fewer eggs to the first
quintile.
45These excluded categories are: jelled aspic salad, sour cream sauce mix, canned roast beef,
canned roast beef hash, retort pouch bags, prepared sandwiches, canned rice, canned dumplings,
canned bread, frozen vegetables in pastry, frozen grapefruit juice, frozen grape juice, frozen orange
juice, frozen cream substitutes, canned ham patties, bathroom accessory, packaged soap, borateem,
dry starch, grease relief, bathroom brushes, miscellaneous brushes, thermometers, dustpans, feather
dusters, laundry baskets, sanitary belts, gift package with candy or gum.
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Soft Drinks 79.38 139.02 4.75 4.17 85.87 53.81
Diet Soft Drinks 74.82 132.79 4.73 5.07 84.18 65.06
Milk 65.65 77.02 3.11 1.79 97.79 35.00
Cereal 57.97 68.37 4.06 2.10 18.05 8.17
Toilet Paper 56.15 49.47 11.44 7.09 17.09 10.51
Yogurt 55.00 75.68 3.28 2.17 17.25 15.22
Coffee 53.97 61.69 8.60 5.74 21.84 11.05
Bread 50.03 47.09 2.88 1.52 20.54 4.64
Cookies 46.97 57.60 3.59 3.44 13.02 6.39
Fresh Meat 46.96 62.86 7.75 5.03 30.48 24.97
Frozen Pizza 44.48 60.64 5.99 3.67 20.69 12.48
Bottled Water 44.06 73.46 4.21 3.75 261.91 181.39
Fresh Fruit 42.68 64.91 4.28 2.06 1.93 1.31
Chocolate Candy 41.05 53.83 3.91 3.67 8.64 9.15
Detergent 40.17 45.29 10.05 7.85 99.52 61.23
Shredded Cheese 39.16 42.80 4.21 2.45 13.37 10.98
Bacon 37.63 45.44 6.87 4.67 17.42 11.88
Ice Cream 37.36 50.34 4.43 2.03 46.80 24.47
Potato Chips 35.99 41.71 3.04 1.89 8.87 3.81
Canned Soup 32.39 38.36 3.21 2.22 22.07 17.33
Note: Using 2004–2017 Nielsen Consumer Panel data, this table reports summary statistics
for the top 20 product categories by total spending. Annual spending is the average spending
in that product category among households that purchased in that product category over
the course of the year. Average price and average size are the average prices and sizes
of products purchased in their corresponding category. All estimates are weighted using
Nielsen’s projection weights. Prices are in nominal 2017 dollars. Sizes are reported in common
units for for that category (e.g. ounces for milk).
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Quantity Discounts and Coupon Savings
This section compares savings from quantity discounts to savings from coupons. To
be conservative, I compare the savings from redeemed coupons (likely higher than the
average savings of all coupons offered) to savings offered by quantity discounts (likely
lower than quantity discounts actually redeemed). For each product purchased in the
Consumer Panel data, households can input the value saved if they used a coupon.
For each product category, I compute the average discount across all products in that
category.
I then estimate quantity discount savings based on moving from a product in the
second quintile to the fourth quintile of the size distribution. This leaves out small
product sizes that may have high unit prices due to convenience (e.g., a 20-oz soda
bottle at the checkout counter) and especially large sizes that may not be widely
available at all stores. This range covers sizes that households are likely to consider
when making their purchase decision.
Figure 1.12 plots the distribution of coupon savings and estimated bulk savings for
food and non-food products. Coupon savings are narrowly clustered with a median
savings of 31% for non-food products and 33% for food products. Bulk discounts have
lower median savings for non-food and food products of 27% and 23%, respectively, but
are more widely dispersed, even exceeding 50% savings for some non-food products.46
Coupon savings are similar across product categories while there is substantial variation
in quantity discounts with non-food products offering higher savings.
Bulk Buying Across Popular Categories
Across popular spending categories, these gaps are particularly large in storable,
non-food categories like paper towels and toilet paper, where households making over
$100,000 are more than twice as likely to buy in bulk compared to households making
under $25,000. In popular food categories like milk and eggs, there is little relationship
or even a negative relationship between income and bulk buying (See Figure 1.13).
46Smaller shifts, such as from the second to third quintile or third to fourth quintile generate
smaller savings, but still preserve the long right tail primarily for non-food products.
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Product Type Food Non−Food
Note: Using 2004–2017 Consumer Panel and 2016 Retail Scanner data, this figure plots the
distribution of savings from coupons and quantity discounts. For each coupon redemption,
the percent savings are the ratio of the coupon value to the product’s price. These savings
are then averaged across all purchases in that product category. Bulk discounts are computed
using coefficient estimates obtained from Equation (1.1) relating log unit prices to log package
sizes. Bulk savings are the estimated savings obtained from moving from the second to the
fourth quintile of the size distribution for each product category.
Alternative Calculation of Missed Quantity Discounts
An alternative way of calculating savings from quantity discounts is to calculate
first-best savings obtained from purchasing the lowest unit-priced item available, since
even high-income households may not be buying at the lowest unit price. I compute
this by taking the difference between the unit price paid by each household and the
lowest unit price available in the store, given the household’s brand preference. I get
this information through linking the Nielsen Consumer Panel with the Nielsen Retail
Scanner data.
I compute the first-best savings a household could obtain for toilet paper, diapers,
milk, and eggs using the following approach. First, for each shopping trip, I compute
the lowest unit price the household could have paid given its brand and store choice
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Product ●Diapers Eggs Milk Paper Towels Toilet Paper
Note: Using 2004–2017 Nielsen Consumer Panel data, this figure plots the income bin
coefficients from Equation (1.2), which regresses the share of annual purchases that were bulk
packages on household characteristics as well as market and year fixed effects. This regression
is estimated for milk, eggs, diapers, toilet paper, and paper towels. Nielsen projection weights
are used to ensure national representativeness. Households making $5–8k are the reference
group. Standard errors are clustered at the DMA level.
in that week. The difference in unit prices relative to the unit price chosen is a
household’s first-best savings for that purchase. Then, to get the average savings for a
household, I compute the expenditure-weighted average savings across all purchases
for each household. Based on this measure, Table 1.18 reports average excess spending
by income group, computed for a family of four.
Overall, households could save over 30% by buying in bulk and low-income house-
holds could save even more. I estimate the differences in savings between households
from the following regression:
Yimt = α +
∑
q
βqIncomeimt + γXimt + λmt + εimt, (1.18)
where Yimt is the excess spending of household i in market m in year t. Incomeimt is
the household’s income bin and Ximt consists of household characteristics. λmt is a
market-year fixed effect. Table 1.19 shows that low-income households miss out on
1.7–1.8 percentage points more savings than high-income households and the excess
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Table 1.18: First-Best Savings by Household Income and Product
Non-Perishable Perishable
Income Toilet Paper Diapers Milk Eggs
<$25k 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.17
$25-50k 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.17
$50-100k 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.17
>$100k 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.18
Note: This table uses 2006–2016 Nielsen Retail Scanner and Consumer Panel data to compute
average savings a household could achieve given its brand and store choice. Average savings
for a family of four is reported above. For example, a household making <$25k could save
36% by purchasing at the lowest unit price available.
spending is primarily in non-food categories like toilet paper (36% savings) and diapers
(33% savings) as opposed to food categories like milk (31% savings) and eggs (17%
savings). Given the perishability of food items, these savings may not be realized if
the product perishes before it can be consumed.
Table 1.19: Regression Results of First-Best Savings Across Household Income and Products
Diapers Toilet Paper Eggs Milk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
25-50k −0.010∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.002
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
50-100k −0.015∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
>100k −0.018∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Demographics Y Y Y Y
Market-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 36,903 182,415 194,413 247,451
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.071 0.117 0.231
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: This table uses 2006–2016 Nielsen Retail Scanner and Consumer Panel data and
reports the income coefficients of Equation (1.18), which regresses savings on household
characteristics as well as a market and year fixed effect. Nielsen’s projection weights are used
for national representativeness.
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Overall, low-income households could benefit substantially from buying in bulk
and obtaining lower unit prices. Furthermore, these savings are likely to be more
important for low-income households since the marginal utility of an additional dollar
of savings is likely to be higher than for high-income households. This analysis also
provides evidence that all households could benefit from purchasing at the lowest unit
price.
Bulk Buying by Store Type or Chain Size
In this section, I analyze whether the effect of unit pricing differs by store type or
chain size. Unit price regulations are only at the state level, but retailers are free
to post (or not post) unit prices as long as they are within the boundaries of the
law. Large chains may post prices uniformly across all stores in a way that meets
the strictest requirements they are subject to. On the other hand, regional chains or
independent stores may more closely mirror the laws of the state they are located in.
I estimate Equation 1.4 using annual household bulk buying at specific stores types
or within different chain sizes. Each observation is at the household-year-channel (or
chain) level. For example, bulk items accounted for 50% of Household A’s grocery
store purchases while bulk items accounted for 100% of Household A’s warehouse club
purchases.
Table 1.20 shows that in the cross-section, stricter unit price regulations are
associated with more bulk buying primarily for grocery stores, drug stores, and
warehouse clubs. Households in states with strict unit price regulations buy in bulk
five percentage points more at grocery stores compared to households in states without
any pricing regulations. Since grocery stores tend to be regional or independent, the
large positive relationship provides strong evidence that unit price regulations can
increase bulk purchasing. Grocery stores also have the richest variety in Nielsen’s data
with over 900 unique retailers being captured compared to 65 drug stores, 25 discount
stores, 17 dollar stores, and 10 warehouse clubs.47 Other store types exhibit smaller
47Nielsen’s categorization includes a “catch-all” category that is not unique to a particular retailer,
so it actually uniquely captures 64 drug stores and purchases at other drug stores are assigned to the
last “catch-all” drug store. Generally, larger retailers are uniquely tracked and smaller ones may fall
into the “catch-all” category.
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Table 1.20: Unit Price Regulations and Bulk Buying by Store Type
Grocery Drug Discount Dollar Warehouse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vol. Disp 0.011 −0.011∗∗∗ −0.006 −0.006 −0.004∗
(0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002)
Mand. Disp 0.029∗∗∗ 0.009 0.014∗ −0.022∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.003)
Mand. Disp, Strict 0.054∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.006 0.006∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002)
Avg Bulk 0.36 0.29 0.49 0.35 0.95
Demographics Y Y Y Y Y
Omit California Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 618,029 298,166 562,749 328,607 267,759
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.001
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Using Nielsen 2004–2017 Consumer Panel data combined with state-level regulations,
this table shows the results of estimating Equation 1.4. The dependent variable is the annual
share of bulk purchases made by households in a particular channel (i.e. store type) and the
independent variables are an ordered measure of regulatory stringency. California is omitted
because it is the only state that has voluntary unit price, but strict requirements on how
unit prices are displayed. Standard errors are clustered by state.
or insignificant effects, which could be because these are generally large chains that
have more uniform pricing practices across all locations.
Table 1.21 shows the results by chain size. Following Jarmin, Klimek, and Miranda
(2009), I define a “local” chain as only having locations in one state, a “regional” chain
has locations in two to ten states, and a “national” chain has locations in more than
ten states. In the cross-section, stricter unit price regulations are associated with more
bulk buying across all chain types. The effect is strongest for local and regional chains,
exhibiting a six to seven percentage point increase in bulk buying relative to states
without unit price regulations. National chains still have significant differences, but
they are a more moderate three to four percentage point difference relative to states
without regulations. Overall, the relative effect is strongest for the smaller chains that
are likely to only be subject to a limited set of regulations and the effect is weaker for
national chains which may be more likely to adopt pricing practices that satisfy the
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Table 1.21: Unit Price Regulations and Bulk Buying by Retailer Size
Local Regional National
(1) (2) (3)
Vol. Disp 0.063∗∗∗ 0.030 0.010
(0.022) (0.025) (0.009)
Mand. Disp −0.067 −0.018 0.039∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.014) (0.009)
Mand. Disp, Strict 0.064∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.014) (0.006)
Avg Bulk 0.33 0.32 0.49
Demographics Y Y Y
Omit California Y Y Y
Observations 1,578 43,756 668,566
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.005 0.037
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
strictest requirements nationwide.
Annual Consumption Analysis
I show that income is not predictive of a household’s toilet paper consumption rate first
using basic OLS regressions. I then formalize the result using a 100-fold cross-validated
elastic net regression to select the most predictive variables. If income and toilet paper
consumption are related, then an OLS regression will extract the correlation.
First, I compute a household’s daily consumption by aggregating the total number
of sheets purchased by a household in a given year, excluding the final purchase of
the year since it may not be consumed within the year. I divide this total by the
number of days between the first and last purchase of the year to get a household’s
average daily consumption rate. This method avoids complications where end of the
year inventory may be carried over to the following year or a household may start the
year with some inventory.
Given a household’s average daily consumption rate, I estimate an OLS regression
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Covariates ● Income and Demographics Income Only
Note: Using 2004–2017 Nielsen Consumer Panel data, this figure plots the income bin
coefficients from Equation (1.19), which regresses average daily household toilet paper
consumption on household characteristics. Average daily consumption is computed by
dividing total quantity purchased in a year by the number of days a household was active in
the panel.
of consumption on household characteristics:
Yi = α + βXi + εi, (1.19)
where Yi is household i’s average daily consumption and Xi is a vector of household
characteristics. Figure 1.14 plots the income coefficients of an OLS regression including
only income covariates and the coefficients when household characteristics are included.
The graph illustrates that after controlling for covariates that plausibly cause increased
consumption, income is not significantly correlated with consumption.
The above specification omits many other possible covariates that could be corre-
lated with average daily consumption. When there are many possible variables that
can be included, there is a risk of over-fitting. Elastic net regularization is a ma-
chine learning method that penalizes over-fitting and selects only the most predictive
variables.
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The elastic net solves the following minimization problem:
min
β
‖y −Xβ‖2 + λ
(
α‖β‖1 + (1− α)‖β‖22
)
, (1.20)
where ‖ · ‖1 is the L1 norm and ‖ · ‖2 is the L2 norm. The OLS estimate is the β that
solves the minimization problem with only the first term. The second term and third
term provide penalties to shrink and select for the most predictive variables.
I set the mixing parameter α to be 0.5. When covariates are correlated in groups,
lasso regression (α = 1) tends to only select one and discard all other members of the
group while ridge regression (α = 0) tends to shrink correlated coefficients towards
each other (Zou and Hastie 2005). Because some of the possible covariates form
natural groups (e.g., all income bins or all markets), I chose α = 0.5 since this tends
to include or exclude groups together.
I estimate a 100-fold cross-validated elastic net regression to select the most
predictive covariates. The resulting estimates selects many household characteristics
including household composition, age, marital status, and race, but excludes almost
all income and geographic coefficients.48
Appendix Tables
Table 1.22: Nielsen Consumer Panel Summary Statistics by Unit Price Regulation
Without Regs With Regs
Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Household income ($000s) 55.65 30.75 59.60 31.70
Household size 2.53 1.43 2.61 1.49
Age 52.34 14.37 53.02 14.43
College Educated 0.37 0.48 0.41 0.49
Child present 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.47
Married 0.52 0.50 0.49 0.50
N (Household-Years) 488,461 246,263
Note: Unweighted means and standard deviations are reported.
48Elastic net results are available upon request.
66
Table 1.23: Nielsen Consumer Panel Summary Statistics for Households that Move
Reg to Reg Reg to No Reg
Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Household income ($000s) 60.03 29.14 62.32 28.60
Household size 2.17 1.20 2.24 1.20
Child present 0.18 0.39 0.17 0.38
Married 0.54 0.50 0.66 0.47
College Educated 0.56 0.50 0.60 0.49
Age 56.24 13.10 58.09 12.53
N (Household-Year) 26,393 6,027
No Reg to Reg No Reg to No Reg
Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Household income ($000s) 59.75 29.02 57.11 28.77
Household size 2.17 1.14 2.25 1.26
Child present 0.15 0.35 0.21 0.41
Married 0.64 0.48 0.58 0.49
College Educated 0.52 0.50 0.55 0.50
Age 59.30 12.34 55.36 13.08
N (Household-Year) 4,260 56,059
Note: Unweighted means and standard deviations are reported.
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Table 1.24: Robustness Test: Warehouse Club Entry on Bulk Buying
5 Mi 10 Mi 15 Mi 20 Mi
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-Entry −0.005 −0.007 0.001 0.005
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Post-Entry : 25-50k 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Post-Entry : 50-100k 0.014∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Post-Entry : >100k 0.017∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Household-ZIP FE’s Y Y Y Y
Year-Qtr FE’s Y Y Y Y
Demographic Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,400,344 2,401,665 2,401,038 2,400,924
Adjusted R2 0.428 0.428 0.428 0.428
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: This table uses 2004–2015 Nielsen Consumer Panel data at the household-quarter
level. Coefficients are reported for Equation (1.9) which regresses households’ quarterly
bulk purchase shares on an indicator for warehouse club entry, an indicator for whether
the household shops at a warehouse club, and an interaction term as well as household
characteristics. Different distance cutoffs defining an “entry” are used for each regression.
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By E. Mallick Hossain
2.1 Introduction
Online shopping has grown dramatically since 2000, reaching 11.4% of total retail
sales in Q4 of 2019 (U.S. Census Bureau 2020). Reasons for this growth include
lower costs (travel, time, etc.), higher convenience, and more variety (Thau 2013;
Arnott 2016). Until 2018, traditional brick-and-mortar stores were at a structural
disadvantage because they had to collect sales taxes while their online competitors
did not. As a result, online retailers could offer consumers, on average, a 7% discount
compared to brick-and-mortar retailers. This discount came strictly at the expense of
state and local tax revenues, with losses ranging from $8 to $33 billion in 2018 (U.S.
Supreme Court 2018).
In this paper, I estimate consumers’ price elasticity using price increases generated
by sales taxes on online purchases. Due to pressure from state and local governments
and aggressive fulfillment center expansion, online retailers (particularly Amazon)
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collect sales taxes in many states. Combining data on online shopping with local
tax rates and Amazon’s tax collection behavior across states over time, I estimate
how consumers’ online purchasing changes when sales taxes are collected online.
Furthermore, I extend this analysis to include measures of online browsing as well
as overall household spending (including offline expenditures) to estimate whether
consumers’ search behavior or their composition of online and offline spending changes
in reponse to online sales tax collection.
I combine online shopping data with offline sales tax rates to estimate whether
areas with higher tax rates respond more strongly to Amazon’s sales tax collection.
Previous research uses a variety of approaches to determine how sensitive consumers
are to tax rates. Table 2.1 summarizes elasticity estimates from previous research.
In the offline environment, research leverages cross-border variation in tax rates
and estimates a wide range of elasticities from −30 to −0.2 (Asplund, Friberg, and
Wilander 2007; Agarwal, Marwell, and McGranahan 2017; Davis 2011; Agarwal et al.
2017; Mikesell 1970). In the online environment, elasticity estimates range from −6 to
0, but early efforts often used data from before 2001, i.e., before the mass adoption
of the internet and before groundbreaking innovations like rating systems and free
shipping were effectively implemented (Scanlan 2007; Ballard and Lee 2007; Alm and
Melnik 2005; Goolsbee 2000). Recent work leverages detailed online shopping data,
but often is limited to particular websites, product categories, or states (Einav et al.
2014; Anderson et al. 2010; Ellison and Ellison 2009; Hu and Tang 2014). My paper
extends the work of Baugh, Ben-David, and Park (2018) and Houde, Newberry, and
Seim (2017) by incorporating data on browsing and total household expenditures to
present a fuller picture of how household behavior changes in response to Amazon’s
sales tax collection.
I use a differences-in-differences approach to estimate a household’s price elasticity.
The expansion of Amazon’s warehouse network and the passage of state laws requiring
online sales tax collection generate variation in Amazon’s tax liability across states
over time. As a result, I am able to examine how household behavior changes after
Amazon begins collecting sales taxes.
I find that consumers reduce their Amazon spending by about 1.9% for each
percentage point of sales tax applied online. Given an average sales tax rate of 7%,
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Table 2.1: Estimated Elasticities




Asplund et al. (2007) – Foreign price 0.2 to 0.5
Asplund et al. (2007) – Domestic price -0.2 to -1.3
Agarwal et al. (2017) -2 to -30
Davis (2011) -2.2 to -3.6




Ballard and Lee (2007) -0.2
Alm and Melnik (2005) -0.5
Einav et al. (2014) -1.8
Goolsbee (2000) -2.3
Tax-Quantity Anderson et al. (2010) -1.9 to -2.9Ellison & Ellison (2009) -6
Tax-
Expenditure
Baugh et al. (2018) -1.2 to -1.4
Houde et al. (2017) -1.3
Hu and Tang (2014) -3.75 to -4.5
Note: Early research focused on how taxes influenced the binary decision of whether or
not to make an online purchase. Subsequent research has looked at how sales taxes affect
actual online expenditures or quantities purchased. In order to delineate between these, I use
“tax-purchase elasticity” to refer to the effect on the purchase decision while “tax-quantity
elasticity” and “tax-expenditure elasticity” refer to the effect on online purchase quantities
and expenditures, respectively.
this elasticity translates into a 13% decline in retail spending on Amazon. Consumers
also increase their spending on Amazon’s taxed competitors by 1% per percentage
point of sales tax collected by Amazon. This is one of the first papers to explicitly
incorporate how consumer search behavior changes in response to tax changes. Even
though consumers do shift their spending from Amazon to its competitors, I find no
evidence that consumers’ browsing habits are significantly affected by Amazon’s sales
tax collection. This is also one of the first papers to examine whether households shift
their spending offline in response to online sales tax collection. I find no evidence that
consumers make such a shift.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data. Section 2.3
analyzes how online spending responds to Amazon sales tax collection. Section 2.4
examines whether online browsing activity is affected by Amazon sales tax collection.
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Section 2.5 analyzes tax responsiveness across all consumer spending modes and
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Data Description
In this section, I describe the data used for my analysis and give a brief overview of
their respective features.49 comScore’s Web Behavior database provides information
on household online shopping and browsing behavior. Nielsen’s Consumer Panel data
provides information on household shopping and purchasing decisions. Finally, Tax
Data Systems provides information on local sales tax rates.
comScore Web Behavior Database
I primarily use the comScore Web Behavior database, which contains the online
browsing and transaction activity of households that opt-in to have their internet
activity collected by comScore. The browsing data records how many minutes were
spent and how many pages were viewed on each website. The transaction data
records the website, product name, product category, price, quantity, and basket total
(including shipping and taxes) of the purchase. The comScore data capture all online
activity of a household and is not limited to particular goods or retailers, in contrast
with previous research. I use this breadth of information to capture whether households
substitute to other retailers and estimate how their aggregate online spending changes
when sales taxes are collected online.
I restrict my sample to households that have complete demographic information
and remove any purchases in categories which Amazon is a not competitor (e.g.,
no plane tickets, dating services, etc.) and focus on products that cost between $1
and $500 (in nominal dollars).50 These filters reduce the original sample of about
49Researcher’s own analyses derived based in part on data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC
and marketing databases provided through the Nielsen Datasets at the Kilts Center for Marketing
Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business.
50This restriction is primarily to screen out extreme prices that may be generated by the comScore
monitoring software. For example, a $20 item reduced to $15 may mistakenly be recorded as $2015
because of how the price information is captured.
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576,000 households down to about 206,000 households and a total of about 2 million
transactions.
Table 2.2: comScore Panel Summary Statistics
Statistic Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max Census(2016)
Household Size 3.04 3 1.40 1 6 2.53
Age 46.65 47 12.59 19 65 51.9
Income 59.01 62.50 31.66 7.50 100.00 59.04
Child Present 0.64 1 0.48 0 1 0.42
Hispanic 0.13 0 0.34 0 1 0.13
Sales Tax 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.11 -
N (Household-Years) 261,416
Note: Age and income are reported in bins, so the midpoint of each bin is used. “Child
Present” indicates whether a child is present in the household. Census data comes from
“Historical Households Tables” and “Income and Poverty in the United States: 2016.”
Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics of the panelists. The average household size
is 3, average age is 47, and average income is $59,000. About 64% of the households
have a child and 13% are Hispanic. Households face an average sales tax rate of 7%.
Overall, panelists are similar to the general population, but are slightly larger and
more likely to have kids. Households rotate through comScore’s panel with a median
tenure of 12 months (the 25th percentile is 9 months and the 75th percentile is 12
months).
Table 2.3 shows the summary statistics for all 2 million transactions. The average
real price of products (in December 2016 dollars) is $39. 28% of products are purchased
on Amazon, 42% from the website of a brick-and-mortar store and the remaining
products are purchased from another online retailer.
Table 2.4 reports the summary statistics of browsing on shopping websites. The
average household spends about two and a half hours per month on shopping websites.
Browsing on Amazon’s untaxed competitors accounts for about one and a half hours,
browsing on Amazon accounts for about 20 minutes and the remaining 40 minutes
is on Amazon’s taxed competitors. There is a wide range of shopping behavior with
many households spending no time on shopping websites in a given month and others
spending up to five hours per day.
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Table 2.3: comScore Transaction Summary Statistics
Statistic Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max
Real Product Price 39.09 20.82 57.06 1.00 608.90
Sales Tax 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.11
Amazon Purchase 0.28 0 0.45 0 1
Offline Amazon Competitor 0.42 0 0.49 0 1
Online Amazon Competitor 0.30 0 0.46 0 1
N 2,001,485
Note: Prices are deflated to December 2016 price levels using the CPI. “Sales Tax” indicates
average local sales tax rate, not the average sales tax paid on online transactions.
Table 2.4: comScore Browsing Summary Statistics (Minutes)
Statistic Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max
Total 152.50 51.7 388.33 0 10,196
Amazon 18.52 0 83.19 0 8,864
Untaxed Competitor 93.46 16 346.00 0 10,176
Taxed Competitor 40.51 8 100.53 0 9,810
N (Household-Months) 2,559,012
Note: Using 2006–2016 comScore Web Behavior data, this table reports the distribution of
monthly browsing durations, in minutes, on shopping websites.
Nielsen Consumer Panel Data
I use the Nielsen Consumer Panel data from 2004–2016. This is a panel of about
178,000 unique households. I observe about 40,000 households each year from 2004–
2006 and about 60,000 households each year from 2007–2016. Households scan all
items that they purchase and then input information about quantities, prices, date of
purchase, and store. Nielsen retains about 80% of its panel from year to year with the
mean and median tenure of a household being four and three years, respectively.
Nielsen computes projection weights to ensure their sample is nationally repre-
sentative. Weights are calculated to match population moments based on household
size, income, age, race, ethnicity, education, occupation, and presence of children.
All analyses use these projection weights unless otherwise stated. Table 2.5 presents
descriptive statistics for households in the sample.
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Table 2.5: Nielsen Consumer Panel Summary Statistics
Variable Mean SD 25th Pctile 75th Pctile Census
Household income ($000s) 56.53 31.41 27.5 85 59.04
Household size 2.55 1.45 1 3 2.53
Age 52.62 14.34 41.5 63 51.9
College Educated 0.38 0.48 0 1 0.37
Child present 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.42
Married 0.50 0.50 0 1 0.48
N (Household-Years) 637,493
N (Households) 154,352
Note: Data are weighted for national representativeness.
Unlike the comScore data, store identities are anonymized, but they are classified
into broad categories such as “Grocery Stores,” “Electronics Store,” and “Online
Shopping.” This categorization is enough to conduct a similar analysis as I do with
the comScore data, with the caveat that the Nielsen data primarily focuses on basic
household goods, so items like electronics and apparel will not be captured. For
retailers with both online and offline presence, Nielsen classifies them separately. For
example, if Firm X has both offline stores and a website, detergent purchased from a
Company X store will be from a different “retailer” than detergent purchased from
CompanyX.com. In the first case, the retailer would be classified as a “Discount Store”
and in the second, the retailer is classified as “Online Shopping.”
Because of their addictive properties and laws regulating purchasing these products
online, I exclude tobacco and alcohol products. I remove households with a student or
military head of household as well as those with an annual income of less than $5,000.
Only about 2% of households are excluded and I use the remaining 154,000 households
for my analysis. See Appendix 2.A for further details of sample construction.
Additional Data Sources
I obtain state, county, and local sales tax rates from Tax Data Systems, now part
of Thomson Reuters. These data contain monthly tax rates at the ZIP code level. I
compile information on state law changes and agreements with Amazon under which
states began collecting taxes for online transactions. This information was gathered
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from a wide range of local, state, and national news sources. Prior to 2018, most
states did not require online retailers to collect sales taxes. They have only been able
to collect sales taxes from Amazon because of separate agreements or because Amazon
has opened warehouses in their state.51 Before 2006, Amazon only collected sales taxes
in Kansas, Kentucky, North Dakota, and Washington. By the end of 2016, Amazon
collected sales taxes in an additional 25 states: Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin as well.
Figure 2.1 shows the wide variation in sales tax rates across the United States
in December 2016. About 80% of counties have combined state and local sales tax
rates between 5.3% and 8.3%. However, sales tax rates range from 0% to over 10% in
Louisiana.
2.3 Amazon Sales Tax Collection and Online
Spending
When shopping online, households can purchase from Amazon or one of its competitors.
Amazon has two types of competitors: taxed and untaxed. Amazon’s taxed competitors
consist of traditional brick-and-mortar retailers, like Walmart and Target, who collect
sales tax since they have physical locations across the country. Amazon’s untaxed
competitors are other online retailers, like Overstock.com or Etsy.com, which do not
have physical locations across the country (generally just a headquarters location).
When Amazon begins collecting sales tax, consumers could respond in a variety of
ways. First, they may not change their behavior and purchase on Amazon like usual
(maybe not even notice the sales tax). Second, they could switch to one of Amazon’s
competitors. They could switch to an untaxed competitor if they value the tax savings
51National Bellas Hess v. Illinois (1967) and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota (1992) ruled that
retailers did not have to collect sales taxes in states where they did not have a physical presence.
The Court held that tabulating tax liabilities for over 6,000 different tax jurisdictions would place an
undue burden on many of these firms (Atkins 2005). The Supreme Court overturned these cases
in South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc. (2018). Before 2018, consumers were supposed to self-report any
unpaid taxes to the tax authorities, but compliance and enforcement were low, so these transactions
were effectively tax-free (Manzi 2015).
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Note: Using December 2016 Tax Data Systems data, this figure plots the spatial distribution
of sales tax rates.
or possibly a taxed competitor that offers a better selection or lower tax-inclusive
prices. I examine each of these in turn to see how spending on Amazon changes and
how spending at Amazon’s taxed and untaxed competitors changes after Amazon
begins collecting sales taxes.
I use a differences-in-differences specification to identify the effect of Amazon’s
sales tax collection on a household’s online spending:
Yht = α + βAmazonCollectht ∗ τht + λh + λt + εht, (2.1)
where Yht measures real expenditures of household h in month t. AmazonCollectht
indicates whether Amazon collects sales tax (determined by month and state of
residence of the household). τht is the local sales tax rate.52 Household and time
fixed effects are captured by λh and λt. β is the coefficient of interest measuring how
52The local tax rate could also be included separately, but given the household fixed effect, this
would only be identified off of changes in local tax rates which are relatively infrequent and when
they do happen, are small.
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spending changes after Amazon begins collecting sales taxes relative to what would
have been expected had they not started collecting sales taxes. All standard errors
are clustered at the state level because once Amazon collects sales taxes, it collects
them across the whole state.
The policy of whether or not Amazon collects sales tax in a particular state
or county is plausibly exogenous to the household spending decision. Often, it is
prompted by the opening of an Amazon warehouse in the state, but in a few cases,
it is because of a change in state law. While there is a chance that these changes
could be related to underlying economic fundamentals, Baugh, Ben-David, and Park
(2018) show that sales tax collection by Amazon is not significantly related to state
GDP growth, household income changes, or consumption declines. About 10% of
households experience a change in Amazon’s sales tax collection while they are in the
sample.
Table 2.6 reports the estimation results. Columns (1) – (3) only include an indicator
for whether or not Amazon collects sales tax and then columns (4) – (6) allow for
the response to vary with the sales tax rate. Column (1) demonstrates that Amazon
spending decreases by an average of $0.422 after Amazon collects sales taxes. Given
that average monthly spending on Amazon is $3.30 and the average sales tax rate is
6.8%, this equates to an elasticity of −0.422/3.30
0.068
= −1.88. Columns (2) and (3) show
that spending on Amazon’s untaxed competitors does not significantly change while
spending on its taxed competitors increases by $0.549, implying a cross-elasticity
of 1.14. Column (4) shows that the spending decreases on Amazon are stronger
in areas with higher sales tax rates and the implied elasticity is a similar -1.87.53
As before, there is no significant response on Amazon’s untaxed competitors and a
marginally significant increase on Amazon’s taxed competitors. The spending increase
on Amazon’s taxed competitors implies an elasticity of 0.97. Overall, after Amazon
collects sales taxes, households reduce their Amazon spending and increase their
spending on Amazon’s taxed competitors.
My estimated elasticity of −1.88 is higher (in magnitude) than similar estimates
from Baugh, Ben-David, and Park (2018) and Houde, Newberry, and Seim (2017).
My estimate differs from Houde, Newberry, and Seim (2017) for two reasons. First,
536.173 / 3.30 = -1.87
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Collect −0.422∗∗ −0.112 0.549∗∗
(0.183) (0.150) (0.249)
Collect * Tax Rate −6.173∗∗ −2.043 6.811∗
(2.715) (2.165) (3.545)
Household FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Mean Spending 3.30 4.86 7.01 3.30 4.86 7.01
Mean Tax 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068
Observations 5,076,040 5,076,040 5,076,040 5,076,040 5,076,040 5,076,040
Adjusted R2 0.124 0.203 0.184 0.124 0.203 0.184
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Using 2006–2016 comScore data on household-month online expenditures, this table
reports the estimation results of Equation 2.1. “Collect” is a dummy variable indicating
whether Amazon collected sales tax in a particular household-month. “Tax Rate” measures
the local sales tax rate faced by a household in a particular month. All expenditures are
real expenditures, deflated to December 2016 using the CPI. “Taxed Sites” refers to websites
of retailers that have offline stores. “Untaxed Sites” are online-only retailers with no offline
stores. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
while I use the same underlying data, I extend my sample for another three years
through 2016, which doubles the number of states in which Amazon begins collecting
sales tax from 12 to 25. Second, their analysis aggregates the data to the county-year
level, while I aggregate the data to the household-month level. I get nearly identical
estimates if I aggregate to the county-year level and limit my sample to 2006–2013.
My estimate also differs from Baugh, Ben-David, and Park (2018) likely because of
differences in the underlying data. First, my analysis spans 2006–2016 compared
to 2011–2015, which adds an additional six states to my analysis.54 Restricting my
analysis to 2011–2015 generates a slightly smaller elasticity of −1.66, but this is still
54Baugh, Ben-David, and Park (2018) also restrict their analysis to households that spend more
than $200 on Amazon in 2011, but their Appendix B shows that removing this filter does not impact
their estimate.
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higher than the −1.2 to −1.4 estimated in Baugh, Ben-David, and Park (2018). The
other possible contributor is the composition of our samples. The comScore data
captures all online activity on a household’s computer and panelists are recruited to
provide a representative measure of US internet users’ activity. On the other hand, the
data used in Baugh, Ben-David, and Park (2018) is from an online account aggregator
that likely targets younger, tech-savvy users interested in managing their finances
effectively.55 These users are probably more likely to shop online and may be less
likely to switch away from Amazon. This assertion is supported by comparing the
average monthly spending on Amazon between the two samples. The average monthly
Amazon spending of a comScore user is only $3.30, but this increases to $12.20 when
restricting to only households that have made purchases on Amazon. In comparison,
the average household in Baugh, Ben-David, and Park (2018) spends $39. Overall,
my estimate is higher than previous estimates because I incorporate more recent data
and (arguably) a more representative sample of online shoppers.
2.4 Amazon Sales Tax Collection and Online
Browsing
The previous section shows that consumers are spending less on Amazon and more on
Amazon’s taxed competitors. Do these changes in spending translate into changes in
search behavior? I estimate Equation 2.1 with Y being minutes spent on Amazon or
one of its competitors’ websites.
Table 2.7 shows the results of this estimation. Our previous results indicate that
households reduce their spending on Amazon only after sales tax is collected online.
Because of this, we might expect that this reduced shopping activity would translate
into reduced overall activity, measured in time spent on the website. Overall, I find no
evidence that search on Amazon or its competitor websites is significantly affected by
Amazon collecting sales tax. The lack of a significant browsing response may indicate
that consumers are not changing their search behavior, but are simply switching their
55One of the most popular financial aggregators, Mint.com, is reported to have a primarily young,
male demographic. 71% of users were male and 64% were under 30 years of age back in 2008 (Perez
2008).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Collect 0.076 0.387 0.512
(0.435) (0.977) (0.640)
Collect * Tax Rate 0.369 6.317 7.160
(5.695) (12.840) (9.243)
Household FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Mean Browsing 11.71 66.66 27.98 11.71 66.66 27.98
Mean Tax 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068
Observations 5,076,040 5,076,040 5,076,040 5,076,040 5,076,040 5,076,040
Adjusted R2 0.463 0.410 0.386 0.463 0.410 0.386
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Using 2006–2016 comScore data on household-month online browsing, this table
reports the estimation results of Equation 2.1. “Collect” is a dummy variable indicating
whether Amazon collected sales tax in a particular household-month. “Tax Rate” measures
the local sales tax rate faced by a household in a particular month. All browsing is in minutes.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
purchases away from Amazon since it no longer has a sales tax advantage.
Households’ relative unresponsiveness in search effort contrasts with the findings
of Einav et al. (2014), which finds that when buyers realize sales taxes are added, they
back out of the transaction. This could be due to differences in user search between
Amazon and eBay. On Amazon, the products are listed at a fixed price while on eBay,
a share of items are sold at auction. In 2010 (the data used in Einav et al. (2014)),
40% of eBay sales were from auctions (eBay.com 2011). Given the risk of losing the
auction, customers may be more likely to search on eBay relative to Amazon, where
there is no risk of losing the purchase. Even if there is an effect that I cannot detect,
it is likely to be small changes in browsing time, which could be generated by the
extra effort needed to complete the purchase (e.g., the time needed to enter in address
and credit card information).
Overall, households reduce their pre-tax expenditures on Amazon and shift to
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Amazon’s taxed competitors. In the next section, I examine whether households
change their overall expenditures with a focus on whether their offline expenditures
change in response to Amazon collecting sales tax.
2.5 Total Consumer Expenditure Analysis
The comScore data suggest that consumers reduce their Amazon expenditures when
Amazon begins collecting sales tax, but they do not spend or browse significantly
more on Amazon’s online competitors. The comScore analysis is limited to examining
only online transactions and activity. Using Nielsen’s Consumer Panel Data, this
section examines how households’ overall spending changes in response to Amazon’s
sales tax collection. Households scan all of the items that they purchase for at-home
consumption and input information about their shopping trip, including whether the
purchase was from an online or offline retailer.56 Using these data, I can determine, for
the common household items that are tracked, whether Amazon’s sales tax collection
changes overall household expenditures and whether households are shifting spending
offline in response.
To identify changes in consumer expenditures, I estimate Equation 2.1 where Y is
the expenditures in either the online-only (likely untaxed) channel or offline channel.
Since Amazon is most competitive in delivering less perishable, non-food products, I
also separately examine whether online or offline non-food spending is affected. About
45% of households experience a change in Amazon’s sales tax collection during their
tenure.
Table 2.8 shows that a range of household spending groups are unaffected by
Amazon’s sales tax collection. Columns 1–3 show that there are no significant changes
in total, online, or offline spending after Amazon begins collecting sales taxes. Even
if there is an effect that I am not detecting, it is likely quite small. Part of this
result is due to the fact that online shopping has low penetration into grocery and
household non-durables (as indicated by online monthly spending averaging $4). Even
when analyzing only non-food items, where online shopping is most likely, there is no
56Retailers are anonymized in Nielsen, so I cannot identify whether an online purchase is made at
a taxed or untaxed website as I could in the comScore data.
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Table 2.8: Household Spending Response to Amazon Sales Tax Collection
Real Spending
Total Online Offline OnlineNon-Groc
Offline
Non-Groc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Collect −0.682 0.036 −0.719 0.001 0.118
(1.734) (0.169) (1.772) (0.095) (0.458)
Household FE Y Y Y Y Y
Month-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Mean Spending 316.39 4.7 311.69 2.93 94.74
Mean Tax 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068
Observations 7,792,355 7,792,355 7,792,355 7,792,355 7,792,355
Adjusted R2 0.531 0.331 0.532 0.226 0.399
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Using 2006–2016 Nielsen Consumer Panel data, this table reports the estimates from
regressing monthly spending on an indicator for Amazon sales tax collection (“Collect”) as
well as household and month-year fixed effects and household demographics. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level.
significant effect and the range of possible changes is quite small.
Because online shopping for household non-durables is relatively infrequent, the
numerous months with no online expenditures may be masking changes in online
purchases when they are made. To check this, I estimate the same regression, but
only using months when purchases are made (i.e., conditional on making a purchase).
Table 2.9 reports the estimates conditional on making a purchase. Even after
conditioning on making a purchase, online spending does not significantly change after
Amazon collects sales taxes. Overall, there is no evidence of households shifting their
spending offline in response to Amazon’s tax collection.
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Table 2.9: Household Spending Response to Amazon Sales Tax Collection (Positive Purchases
Only)
Real Spending
Total Online Offline OnlineNon-Groc
Offline
Non-Groc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Collect −0.682 1.063 −0.699 −0.107 0.128
(1.734) (1.106) (1.755) (0.974) (0.458)
Household FE Y Y Y Y Y
Month-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Mean Spending 316.39 72.57 312.2 52.94 99.55
Mean Tax 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068
Observations 7,792,355 482,702 7,782,003 408,811 7,464,450
Adjusted R2 0.531 0.377 0.532 0.234 0.392
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Using 2006–2016 Nielsen Consumer Panel data, this table reports the estimates from
regressing monthly spending (conditional on have positive spending that month) on an
indicator for Amazon sales tax collection (“Collect”) as well as household and month-year
fixed effects and household demographics. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
2.6 Future Research and Conclusion
Using data covering a broad range of online shopping activity, I find that consumers
reduce their pre-tax spending on Amazon by about 1.9% for every percentage point
of sales tax that Amazon collects. Furthermore, I find that households increase their
spending on Amazon’s taxed competitors by 1% for each percentage point of sales
tax Amazon collects. Even though households change their spending, they do not
significantly change their search behavior on Amazon or its competitors. Finally, I find
no evidence that households shift any of their spending offline after Amazon collects
sales tax.
In light of the recent Supreme Court case, South Dakota v. Wayfair which
increases state enforcement of sales tax collection online, state and local governments
can expect a revenue boost because consumers are unlikely to shift their spending
to untaxed channels. However, local policymakers and businesses will need to find
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other approaches if they want to encourage shoppers to move back offline. Online
shopping is here to stay and more empirical work will be necessary to understand how
traditional offline retailers can adapt to increased online shopping.
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2.A Data Appendix
comScore Web Behavior
This section provides more details about how I prepared the comScore data for
analysis. All comScore data was obtained directly from Wharton Research Data
Services (WRDS). I drop any households with incomplete demographic information.
Additionally, I remove any households whose ZIP codes do not match with the
Census Bureau’s 2010 Zip-to-County Relationship file. Table 2.10 shows that 35%
of households remain based on these filters. The low retention rate is primarily a
majority of households in the comScore data just browse the internet and make no
online purchases while they are in the sample.
Table 2.10: comScore Sample
Step HH
Starting HH: 586, 420
Complete demographics: 585, 867
Valid ZIPs: 576, 457
Made Online Purchase: 206, 435
Note: Table reports the number of households remaining in sample after each step of data
cleaning.
For online transactions, I remove any transactions that are recorded for the same
visit, same price, same time, and same product as a duplicate record. I also restrict
my sample to products in categories that Amazon competes in, which excludes travel,
dating, and financial products. Furthermore, I drop any transactions where the price
is missing, less than $1 or greater than $500. Then, I remove any products that
were sold by websites that do not feasibly compete with Amazon (e.g. daysinn.com
or date.com).57 Table 2.11 shows that most transactions are omitted because they
57The full list of domains is available in the replication code.
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are duplicates or in non-Amazon competitive categories. The remaining portion of
transactions are removed because the household did not make any Amazon purchase
while they were in the sample. Overall, 41% of all transactions are made in Amazon
competitive categories.
Table 2.11: comScore Transactions Data Construction
Step Transactions
Starting Transactions: 4, 934, 867
Unduplicated Transactions: 3, 956, 424
Amazon Categories: 2, 478, 115
Invalid Prices: 2, 269, 680
Invalid Domains: 2, 021, 800
Note: Table reports the number of transactions remaining after each step of data cleaning.
Nielsen Consumer Panel Data
This section provides more details about how I prepared the Nielsen Consumer Panel
Data for analysis. I download the data directly from the University of Chicago Kilts
Center for Marketing. I then remove any households with a military or student head
of household or those that are making less than $5,000 annually. Table 2.12 shows
that only 2% of households are removed by these criteria.
Table 2.12: Homescan Sample Construction
Step HH
Starting HH: 158, 004
Exclude military and students: 155, 256
Exclude Households under 5k: 154, 352
Note: Table reports the number of households remaining after each step of data cleaning.
In the purchases data, I remove any alcohol and tobacco products as well as product
categories that Nielsen has not consistently tracked over the full 2006–2016 period
(i.e., “deferred modules”). I also exclude products that do not have Universal Product
Codes (i.e., “magnet modules”). Finally, I remove any products with a recorded price
of zero.
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One final note for those familiar with Nielsen’s data products. Theoretically, I
could use the Scanner data to determine whether an “online” retailer and another
retailer share the same parent company (for the set of retailers that Nielsen track in
their data). Unfortunately, none of the “Online Shopping” retailer codes are present in
the Nielsen Scanner Data, so I cannot distinguish if the online retailer is the website




MADE FROM SCRATCH: HOW
SNAP BENEFITS AFFECT
LOTTERY SALES
By E. Mallick Hossain and Jason Sockin
3.1 Introduction
State lotteries are an important source of revenue for state budgets, yet it is well
documented that state lotteries are regressive (Price and Novak 2000; Combs, Kim, and
Spry 2008) and appeal to low-income households (Haisley, Mostafa, and Loewenstein
2008; Blalock, Just, and Simon 2007). While lotteries are also a common form of
entertainment (and possibly investment) for households, lotteries cannot substitute for
food or other necessary goods and services. In order to assist low-income households in
purchasing groceries, the U.S. government provides subsidies through the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). However, these subsidies do not translate
into increased food consumption in a one-to-one fashion (Hastings and Shapiro 2018).
Lottery purchases are often funded by reductions in non-gambling expenditures
(Kearney 2005) and in Pennsylvania, 41% of lottery sellers are also stores where
low-income households can purchase food using their SNAP benefits.
Our paper answers the question: Do SNAP benefits subsidize gambling? Because
SNAP benefits effectively operate as cash for purchasing groceries, the cash that
would have otherwise been spent on groceries can thus be used towards funding other
activities, such as gambling. On the other hand, if they increase grocery spending,
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households may reduce their shopping trips and therefore gamble less frequently. To
answer this question, we analyze the universe of state lottery tickets sold by retailers in
Pennsylvania, and estimate how responsive lottery ticket sales are to the prevalence of
SNAP-benefit households and the ability of stores to accept SNAP benefits. Previous
research estimates that households spend 50–60% of their SNAP benefits on food
(Hastings and Shapiro 2018)—or 40–50% on non-food expenditures—suggesting that
a pass-through of SNAP benefits to gambling behavior is plausible and possibly
non-trivial. Other research has found that other government transfers affect “sin”
behaviors with unemployment insurance generating increases in drinking, but decreases
in smoking (Lantis and Teahan 2018; Fu and Liu 2019).
Our paper is the first to estimate the relationship between SNAP benefits and
lottery sales as well as present new stylized facts about the overlap between lottery
retailers and SNAP-eligible retailers. Previous work has shown that the majority of
SNAP benefits are spent on food (Hastings and Shapiro 2018), but little is known about
what other products households spend SNAP on. Furthermore, lottery purchases are
often funded by reductions in food and housing expenditures (Kearney 2005). For
low-income households, the marginal benefits of these expenditures may be particularly
high.
Second, we present a novel dataset on the universe of monthly store-level lottery
ticket sales for Pennsylvania from October 2002 through March 2019. This data
illustrates the rich diversity in the stores that sell lottery tickets, the kinds of lottery
tickets that are most popular, and where these stores are located.
Our paper uses a differences-in-differences approach that leverages a wide range of
policy shocks to establish a link between lottery sales and SNAP benefits and then
estimate the relationship between lottery sales and SNAP benefits. Our main analysis
utilizes the recent 2018–2019 US government shutdown, the longest on record, to
establish the link between SNAP and lottery sales. The shutdown did not ex post
change the amount of SNAP benefits that households received, but it did affect how
they were disbursed and increased uncertainty around the program. We then use the
American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009 (ARRA) to estimate the elasticity
of lottery ticket sales with respect to SNAP benefits because this legislation generated
changes in the benefits received by households.
91
We find that during the 2018–2019 government shutdown, sales of scratch-off
tickets were 7% lower at SNAP-eligible stores than they would have been if they had
not been affected by the shutdown, while sales of draw tickets (e.g., Powerball) were
unaffected. This finding demonstrates a link between SNAP and lottery sales. Since
SNAP benefits were unchanged ex post, we use other policy shocks to estimate the
elasticity of lottery sales with respect to SNAP benefits. Using the introduction of
ARRA in which SNAP benefits increased by an average of 13.6%, we find that sales
of draw lottery tickets declined by 28% relative to their pre-ARRA trend, implying an
elasticity of -2.1. Upon ARRA’s expiration, the 5% drop in SNAP benefits precipitated
a 2% increase in draw lottery sales and a 7% increase in scratch-off sales relative to
pre-expiration trends. These estimates imply an elasticity of -1.4 to -0.4. While these
estimates range widely, they all suggest that SNAP benefits actually discourage lottery
gambling. One possible mechanism for this decrease is that increases in SNAP benefits
decrease shopping frequency (Makioka 2018), and therefore reduce the opportunities
for lottery gambling.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes important
details about the SNAP program. Section 3.3 describes the data. Section 3.4 presents
facts about household lottery spending. Section 3.5 presents the model and estimation
results and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Background
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is the largest federal nutri-
tional assistance program. It is administered by Food and Nutrition Service (FNS)
of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and provides assistance for
low-income households to purchase food. It was previously known as the “food stamp”
program. SNAP benefits can be used to buy food that will be eaten at home such as
breads, cereals, fruits, vegetables, meat, and dairy products. SNAP benefits cannot
be used to purchase alcohol, tobacco, health items, personal care items, soap, paper
products, household supplies, or hot foods.
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Household Eligibility and Benefits
To be eligible for the program, households must have a gross income below 130%
of the Federal poverty level.58 Additionally, households must meet various work
requirements and cannot have more than $2,250 in assets, excluding housing and
vehicles. Upon being approved, households receive an Electronic Benefit Transfer
(EBT) card with their SNAP benefits loaded onto it. The EBT card acts as a debit
card for SNAP-eligible food items at stores that accept SNAP benefits. SNAP benefits
are disbursed monthly to eligible households.
Benefit amounts decrease as household income increases. As an example, in
Pennsylvania in 2019, the maximum benefit a 4-person household could receive is
$646. However, the actual benefit received is this maximum amount minus 30% of
the household’s net monthly income. Therefore, if the household received $1,000 in
monthly net income, it would only have a SNAP benefit of $646 - $300 = $346. As
of February 2018, 1.8 million people were receiving SNAP benefits in Pennsylvania
(SNAPFacts).
Store Eligibility
Stores must apply to the USDA to be eligible to accept SNAP benefits. Only stores
that sell “staple foods” are eligible to apply. “Staple foods” include fruits and vegetables;
meat, poultry, and fish; dairy products; and breads or cereals. Stores where at least
50% of their sales are from “staple foods” will be approved. If stores do not meet the
sales requirement, as long as they maintain a minimum level and variety of “staple
food” inventory, they will also be approved. According to the USDA, most stores
are approved based on meeting the minimum inventory requirements. A summary of
additional regulatory detail is in Appendix 3.A.
Policy Changes Affecting SNAP
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
On February 17, 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was
passed. This stimulus bill increased household SNAP benefits by 13.6% (effective April
58Residents of Alaska and Hawaii have higher limits compared to the contiguous United States.
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1, 2009), which was an average of $80 per month for a household of 4. Additionally, it
expanded eligibility of jobless adults without children. The benefit increase expired on
November 1, 2013, which decreased benefits by an average of 5% (Beatty and Tuttle
2014; Rosenbaum and Keith-Jennings 2013).
U.S. Government Shutdown (2018-2019)
The 2018-2019 government shutdown was the longest in US history, lasting 35 days
from December 22, 2018, through January 25, 2019. The shutdown was precipitated
by disagreements over funding for a wall along the US-Mexico border and affected the
SNAP program. To ensure the food security of SNAP recipients, the USDA worked
with states to issue February SNAP benefits on or before January 20, 2019 (USDA
2019). In Pennsylvania, the February benefits were issued statewide on January
16, 2019, which was different than the usual disbursement schedule in which SNAP
benefits are issued between the first and tenth day of each month (Lubrano 2019;
USDA 2020).
Pennsylvania Lottery
Created in 1971, the Pennsylvania Lottery is the state-run lottery of Pennsylvania
and is the only state lottery to use its proceeds to fund programs for older residents
such as centers, meals, prescription assistance, and transportation. It offers many
different games, which can be grouped into two main categories:
• Draw Games: Players choose a set of two to six numbers (depending on the
specific game). The Lottery randomly draws a set of two to six numbers as well
and if players match a subset, they win a fixed prize. If they match all numbers
drawn, they win the jackpot, which continues to accumulate value until someone
wins it. Common examples of draw games are Powerball and Mega Millions.
Ticket prices range from $0.50 to $3.
• Instant Games: These games are also known as “scratchers” or “scratch-offs.”
Players purchase a ticket with spaces that can be scratched off to reveal symbols.
If those symbols match various winning combinations, the player wins a prize
based on which combination is matched. Prizes and odds are pre-specified and
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do not change, in contrast to draw games where the jackpot can vary over time.
Prizes range from $5 to $3 million and ticket prices range from $1 to $30. More
expensive tickets offer better odds and/or larger prizes.59
Any Pennsylvania business can become a licensed lottery retailer as long as it
passes a credit check, background investigation, tax clearance check, and is compliant
with the Americans with Disabilities Act.60 Lottery retailers earn commissions on the
lottery tickets that they sell as well as other bonuses and incentives.
3.3 Data
We obtain data from two administrative sources: (1) the Pennsylvania Department
of Revenue provides store-level lottery ticket sales by game and month and (2) the
USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service (which administers SNAP) provides store-level
eligibility spells to accept SNAP benefits. This section briefly describes the data and
how they were combined.
SNAP Store Eligibility Data
We obtain store eligibility data from the USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service. This
data contains the name and address of each SNAP-eligible store, the store type, and
their dates of eligibility (i.e., an observation is a store-eligibility period). The USDA
specifies 17 types of stores, which we aggregate into three categories: convenience
stores (including small, urban grocery stores), supermarkets, and restaurants.61 We
geocode each store’s location using Texas A&M’s Geocoding Services.62 We restrict
our analysis to addresses that were able to be matched exactly based on the address
or parcel or interpolated based on the address range (“high-quality” matches). For
59The authors stress that the expected value of any lottery ticket remains negative, it just might
be less negative for more expensive tickets. Buying a lottery ticket remains a poor investment.
60Retailers that are not compliant can get assistance from the Pennsylvania Lottery to offset costs
incurred to become compliant through the American with Disabilities Act PA Lottery ADA Program.
61Restaurants are generally not eligible to accept SNAP benefits, but some neighborhood delis




example, if the geocoding database does not contain 131 Main Street, but has geocodes
for 123 Main Street and 141 Main Street, it will interpolate the geocoded location
between those addresses.
After geocoding, we have 15,377 unique locations and 95% of these locations are
“high-quality” matches. Locations may have more than one eligibility spell, but we
find that most do not. 65% of locations only have one eligibility spell and 19% have
two spells. Finally, locations tend to be eligible for long periods of time with the
median eligibility spell being 5 years and the interquartile range is from 2 to 13 years.
After organizing, this data consists of SNAP-eligibility spells by geocoded location.
Pennsylvania Lottery Data
Monthly store-level lottery ticket sales from October 2002 through March 2019 were
obtained through an open-records request to the Pennsylvania Department of Rev-
enue.63 The data consists of names and addresses of each lottery terminal as well as
the monthly net sales of lottery tickets by individual ticket type. Since retailers can
have multiple terminals, we aggregate all sales to the geocode level. For each location,
we aggregate lottery ticket sales into two categories: instant sales (e.g., “scratchers”)
and draw sales (e.g., Powerball).64
Over the June 2018 to March 2019 time period, we observe 14,255 unique lottery
machines across 9,335 unique locations.65 The vast majority of locations have only
one or two lottery machines. Each month, about 13,000 machines record positive sales.
The distribution of monthly ticket sales is reported in Table 3.1. The table shows that
scratch-off tickets account for about two-thirds of total lottery sales.
In order to match this data with the SNAP data, we geocode each store’s location
using the same approach as outlined for the SNAP data. 86–88% of lottery ticket sales
can be assigned to high-quality geocodes and 87% of lottery machines with positive
sales are captured.
63Currently we are awaiting updated data from October 2002–May 2018 because of coverage issues
identified by authors. For comparison, the earlier data only captured 20% of publicly reported sales
while the June 2018 data was within 2% of publicly reported sales. Many high-grossing stores are
not present in the earlier data sample.
64We also obtained jackpot data for Powerball and MegaMillions from BeatLottery.net.
65The number of geographic locations is likely underestimated because in unmatched cases, the
geocoder assigns the location to the centroid of the ZIP code.
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Table 3.1: Distribution of Monthly Lottery Ticket Sales
Variable Mean SD 25th Pctile Median 75th Pctile
Total 29, 679 34, 652 5, 347 16, 526 43, 205
Scratch-Off 20, 367 25, 287 2, 100 10, 500 30, 466
Draw 9, 312 13, 382 987 4, 551 12, 138
Note: Using lottery sales data from June 2018 through March 2019, this table reports the
distribution of monthly lottery sales.
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SNAP Share of Households
(b) County SNAP Participation
Note: Using PA Lottery sales data and SNAP store-eligibility, Figure (a) plots the share
of lottery ticket sales at SNAP-eligible stores by county and Figure (b) plots the share of
SNAP households by county.
Merging Datasets
After geocoding each location, we match each entry based on their geocodes (i.e.,
latitude and longitude). If a lottery retailer and a SNAP-eligible location have the
same geocode, we treat them as the same location.66 Since lottery retailers that are
not in the SNAP data do not have store types, we manually classify many of these
stores. The summary of the store types is provided in Table 3.2. While SNAP-eligible
66We make some manual corrections because stores in shopping plazas often share the same
geocode. In these cases, there may be different store types (e.g., a grocery store and a liquor store) at
the same geocode. This matching strategy is better than a fuzzy name and address match because
lottery store names are recorded by location, but companies with multiple stores may only file a
single SNAP application under the holding company name. As a result, if ABC Holdings, LLC owns
Shop XYZ, “Shop XYZ” will be recorded in the lottery data while “ABC Holdings, LLC” will be
recorded in the SNAP data.
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stores account for 41% of lottery retailers, they make up 52% of lottery sales, a
disproportionately higher share. Furthermore, the types of stores that accept SNAP
benefits are primarily grocery and convenience stores. Most large grocery stores are
eligible to accept SNAP benefits while convenience stores are more evenly split between
those that accept SNAP benefits and those that do not. The remainder of non-SNAP
lottery retailers are primarily bars, restaurants, check-cashing establishments, and
tobacco shops.67
Table 3.2: Lottery Sale Shares by Store Type
Stores Sales
Store Type SNAP Non-SNAP SNAP Non-SNAP
Conv. Store 0.32 0.28 0.39 0.30
Grocery 0.08 0.01 0.14 0.01
Food / Alcohol 0.005 0.14 0.002 0.06
Misc 0.001 0.16 0.0005 0.11
Total 0.41 0.59 0.52 0.48
Note: Using lottery sales data from June 2018 through March 2019, this table reports the
share of lottery sales at SNAP and non-SNAP-eligible retailers. “Conv. Stores” denotes gas
stations, convenience stores, corner shops, and pharmacies. “Grocery" denotes grocery stores
that offer a large selection of fresh produce and other food items. “Food / Alcohol” denotes
restaurants, bars, and beer/wine/spirits stores. “Misc” denotes check-cashing stores, social
clubs, and remaining unclassified lottery retailers.
Consumer Expenditure Survey
We also use the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics to obtain information on household-level gambling. The CEX samples
about 7,000 households and interviews them for four consecutive quarters. Detailed
household demographics and income information are collected at the start and end of
a household’s tenure in the sample.
67The “Misc” category includes a long tail of establishments that have not been classified and
may include stores that fit into other categories. Based on inspection, many of these appear to be
convenience stores that were not classified based on our existing classification algorithm.
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3.4 Lottery Gambling Patterns
This section examines aggregate patterns in lottery gambling. First, we present
aggregate county-level patterns and then we examine household-level patterns in
lottery spending.
To examine county-level patterns in lottery gambling, we regress per-capita lottery
sales on county-level characteristics, including income, unemployment, and a range of
government transfer payments, including SNAP payments.
log(Salesct) = α + βXct + λc + λt + εct, (3.1)
where Salesct are total lottery ticket sales in county c in year t. X includes log per-
capita measures of income, unemployment insurance, Social Security payments, SNAP
payments, and the Earned Income Tax Credit payments, along with the unemployment
rate. λ captures county and year fixed effects. We estimate this regression using
lottery sales from 2003–2017. Table 3.3 reports the results for draw and scratch-off
sales separately.
Across both draw and scratch-off sales, increases in county-level SNAP payments
are associated with increases in lottery sales, while increases in the unemployment rate
are associated with decreases in lottery sales. Counties that experience a 10% increase
in per-capita SNAP payments are expected to increase lottery sales by 1.4–1.9%.
While this reveals aggregate patterns in lottery ticket sales, it is unclear what is
driving this pattern, assuming SNAP transfers directly affect lottery sales.
Increases in SNAP transfers could be generated by more households obtaining
SNAP (extensive margin) or by existing SNAP households receiving more generous
benefits (intensive margin). If increases in SNAP transfers are primarily generated
by the extensive margin, then lottery sales could increase if SNAP households are
more likely to play the lottery. On the other hand, if increases in SNAP transfers are
primarily generated by increased benefits to existing households, then lottery sales
could increase if these benefits are “passed through” to purchase lottery tickets. In
order to determine whether there are significant differences in gambling between SNAP
and non-SNAP households, we turn to the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).
The CEX is advantageous for this purpose because since 2004, households have been
asked about both their lottery consumption and their SNAP benefits. In particular,
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Avg Sales 25.39 54.62
Year FE’s Y Y
County FE’s Y Y
Observations 990 990
Adjusted R2 0.893 0.861
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Using lottery sales data from 2003–2017 combined with BEA’s Regional Economic
Accounts data, this table reports the results of regressing log annual lottery ticket sales, by
county, on county-level transfer payments. All variables are log per-capita measures except
for the unemployment rate, which is included as is.
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households report the dollar amount consumed each quarter on “lotteries and games
of chance” as well as the dollar value of the last food stamps or EBT received each
quarter. The former offers intensive and extensive margins for analyzing lottery
purchases between SNAP and non-SNAP households, a distinction which the latter
provides. Although the CEX is a (representative) survey of household expenditures,
it is better used as a cross-section of households instead of a panel to track changes
within households, meaning this dataset can at most afford us a correlation between
SNAP benefits and lottery expenditures.
Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3.2 summarize SNAP benefits across income groups
in the CEX dataset. Reassuringly, SNAP recipients in the CEX are predominantly
concentrated among the lowest income brackets. Across SNAP-receiving households,
we see less variation in the dollar amount that SNAP households on average receive.
Households that earn less than $10,000 per year in total income earn about $800 per
quarter on average from SNAP benefits, where as SNAP-eligible households above
$10,000 accumulate roughly $1,200 per quarter in benefits. How does this translate to
expenditures on lotteries? Panel (c) reveals that SNAP-eligible households across the
income spectrum purchase lottery tickets at similar rates to non-SNAP households,
and perhaps at even higher rates within higher-income brackets.68 This confirms that
SNAP-eligible households spend money on lotteries. Panel (d) reveals that SNAP-
households spend a similar, perhaps slightly smaller, amount of their quarterly income
on lotteries compared with non-SNAP households. Panels (e) and (f) investigate if
there is a relation between the magnitude of SNAP benefits and lottery purchases:
There does appear to be a slight uptick in lottery incidence for households receiving
more SNAP benefits, but no clear trend is apparent in lottery expenditures.
To investigate the relation between lotteries and SNAP benefits further, we turn
to a regression analysis. The first four columns of Table 3.4 explore the the extensive
margin of lottery purchases by implementing a linear probability model. The last four
columns explore the intensive margin of lottery purchases, conditional on households
purchasing lotteries that year-quarter. SNAP households in the CEX data are 1.7
68Although are incidence rates for lottery expenditures is relatively low compared with other
studies—which may be due to the miscellaneous nature of reporting lottery expenditures in the CEX
survey—reassuringly we find a similar pattern of increasing incidence with income as in Kearney
(2005).
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Figure 3.2: SNAP and Lotteries in CEX
(a) Snap incidence (b) Snap value
(c) Lottery incidence (d) Lottery expenditure to income ratio
(e) Lottery incidence for recipients (f) Lottery expenditures for recipients
Note: CEX Data
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Table 3.4: CEX - Purchases Lotteries
Has lottery purchase Log lottery purchase
Receives food stamps -0.017∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.307∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.045) (0.045)
Log value of food stamps 0.006∗∗ 0.002 0.021 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.022) (0.020)
Log family income 0.017∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.035)
Education and race FE, age cubic X X X X X X X X
State and year-quarter FE X X X X X X X X
N 321269 321269 26190 26190 37029 37029 2362 2362
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11
Notes: CEX data.
percentage points less likely to purchase lotteries compared with non-SNAP households
(Column 1), however this gap is driven by differences in household income rather than
preferences (Column 2). Among SNAP-eligible households, while there appears to be
a positive relation between SNAP benefit amount and lottery expenditures (Column
3), this slope appears to be driven by differences in total household income rather
than SNAP income.
While SNAP households purchase lotteries at similar rates conditional on their
total income, they do appear to spend less on lotteries. On average, SNAP households
spend about 26% less (31 log-points) on lotteries than non-SNAP households (Column
5). Controlling for household income (including SNAP benefits) reduces this gap
to 16% between SNAP and non-SNAP households. And conditional on households
receiving SNAP benefits, there does not appear to be any relation between the
amount of benefits a household earns and its lottery expenditures (Columns 7 and 8).
Importantly though, this only reveals that higher-SNAP-benefit households do not
purchase more lottery tickets than lower-SNAP-benefit households, not necessarily
that a single SNAP-eligible household that experienced a windfall (haircut) in SNAP
benefits would buy more (less) lottery tickets.
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3.5 Empirical Model
The previous section found no evidence that SNAP and non-SNAP households play
the lottery at different rates. If anything, SNAP households spend less on lotteries
than non-SNAP households. This section examines whether changes in SNAP benefits
(intensive margin) affect lottery ticket sales. To establish a link between SNAP benefits
and lottery sales, we use a differences-in-differences approach that leverages shocks to
the SNAP program, but that did not affect the Pennsylvania Lottery.
Government Shutdown
The first shock we leverage is the 2018–2019 government shutdown. During the
shutdown, there was heightened uncertainty about whether SNAP benefits would be
affected. Ultimately, the timing of benefit payouts was modified, but the total amount
of benefits was unchanged. If a relationship exists, then the early SNAP disbursement
will only affect SNAP-eligible lottery retailers and SNAP-ineligible retailers will serve
as the control group.
A priori household behavior in response to these “early, not extra” benefits is
unclear. On one hand, the USDA and state agencies had limited time and resources to
communicate this change to recipients and households may have treated these benefits
as extra and therefore increased their spending. On the other hand, households may be
aware that these are “early, not extra” and appropriately budgeted, therefore spending
like they normally would. On the third hand, the shutdown increased uncertainty
because households were suspicious that the government would penalize them for
using more benefits than they were entitled to (Lubrano 2019). Additionally, the
shutdown duration was indeterminate and there was a risk that March benefits would
be reduced and April benefits may be eliminated if the shutdown extended into the
spring (Lubrano 2019). Because of this uncertainty and the fact that SNAP benefits
roll over each month, households may have reduced spending to generate precautionary
savings against an extended shutdown. Regardless of how households treated these
benefits, the important factor is that this federal shock is not expected to affect the
state-run lottery.
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The differences-in-differences specification is as follows:
log(Salesict) = α +
∑
τ 6=Dec 2018
βτSNAPi ∗ 1{t = τ}+ λct + λi + εict, (3.2)
where Salesict denotes the lottery ticket sales of store i in county c month t. SNAPi
is an indicator for the SNAP-eligibility of store i. λi and λct are store and county-
month-year fixed effects, respectively.
This specification models how lottery sales evolve over time and βt captures whether
lottery sales at SNAP-eligible stores behave differently than at non-SNAP-eligible
stores in month t (December 2018 is the reference month). We remove any stores that
change their SNAP eligibility status over this period to ensure that βt is identified
off of changes in lottery sales over time between the two groups and not changes in
the SNAP eligibility of a store. Even though lottery sales are highly seasonal with
promotions around holidays, the non-SNAP month indicators capture this seasonality,
so we can identify the effect of the government shutdown separate from seasonal
fluctuations in sales from βτ .
As a further check, if lottery sales at SNAP-eligible stores behave differently
than sales at non-SNAP stores, then the effect would also be tied to the density
of households receiving SNAP benefits in the surrounding county. SNAP-eligible
stores in counties with low densities of households that participate in SNAP may
experience less of a shock than SNAP-eligible stores in counties with high densities of
SNAP-participating households. To test this, we replace the SNAP dummy variable
with an interaction term of the SNAP dummy and county-level SNAP participation
rates. Any county-specific trends will be captured by the county-year-month fixed
effect.
Figure 3.3 plots the values of βt and illustrates that there are no significant
differences in log lottery sales trends prior to January 2019, with the exception of
a spike in October 2018. This spike is likely attributable to the fact that both the
Powerball and Mega Millions jackpots were at record or near-record highs of $602.5
million and $1.6 billion, respectively. Figure 3.4 illustrates that draw sales track
jackpots while instant sales are less responsive.
During the shutdown, scratch-off sales at SNAP stores decreased by a dramatic
12% and then started recovering through March, but were still depressed by 9% relative
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Note: Using PA Lottery sales data and SNAP store-eligibility, this figure plots differences in
lottery ticket sales at SNAP-eligible relative to expected sales had they evolved similarly to
sales at non-SNAP-eligible stores by month. Shading denotes period where SNAP benefits
were disbursed early (i.e., January disbursements were doubled and February disbursements
were zero).



















































Note: Using PA Lottery sales data and jackpot data, this figure plots monthly lottery ticket
sales by game type and the monthly maximum jackpot amount for the Powerball and Mega
Millions multi-state lotteries.
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to trends at non-SNAP stores. On the other hand, draw sales were not significantly
different between SNAP and non-SNAP eligible stores.
We should note that these estimates may be understated. The main reason for
this is that households could “pass-through” their SNAP benefits to lottery tickets
at non-SNAP-eligible stores. While we do not assume that all SNAP pass-through is
spent on lottery tickets at SNAP-eligible stores, we believe that it is more likely to
occur at a SNAP-eligible store due to convenience. Because this bias works against
us, our estimates provide a lower bound on the magnitude of the shutdown’s effect on
lottery sales.
Finally, to concisely report the estimation results for the period of the shutdown,
we estimate a modified version of Equation 3.2 that better focuses on the shutdown
period:
log(Salesict) = α +
∑
t
βtSNAPi ∗ 1{t ∈ Shutdown}+ λct + λi + εict, (3.3)
where Salesict denotes the lottery ticket sales of store i in county c in month t. SNAPi
is an indicator for the SNAP-eligibility of store i. 1{t ∈ Shutdown} indicates if month
t is during the impacted period of January or February 2019. λi and λct are store and
county-month-year fixed effects, respectively.
Table 3.5 reports the results. Columns (1) and (2) show that draw lottery sales
were not significantly affected during the shutdown while scratch-off sales decreased
by 7–8% during the months affected by the shutdown. Columns (3) and (4) show
that this effect is stronger at SNAP-eligible stores in counties with higher levels of
SNAP participation. A store in a county with a ten percentage point higher SNAP
participation rate would be expected to experience 1.4 percentage points lower draw
sales during January and 3.7 percentage points lower scratch-off sales.
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
In order to quantify the relationship between SNAP benefits and lottery sales, we
use the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). ARRA
increased the SNAP benefits for all SNAP recipients by an average of 13.6%, effective
April 1, 2009. We use this variation to estimate another differences-in-differences
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Table 3.5: SNAP Lottery Sales Estimation Results (Gov’t Shutdown)
Log Sales
Draw Scratch Draw Scratch





Jan-19 : SNAP Density −0.144∗ −0.367∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.100)
Feb-19 : SNAP Density −0.042 −0.360∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.100)
Avg Sales 12512 27091 12512 27091
Store FE’s Y Y Y Y
County-Month FE’s Y Y Y Y
Observations 80,990 80,990 80,990 80,990
Adjusted R2 0.887 0.809 0.887 0.809
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Using 2018–2019 PA lottery sales data, this table reports the estimation results of
Equation 3.3. "Jan-19" and "Feb-19" indicate the months of SNAP benefits affected by the
shutdown. "SNAP Density" denotes the share of households within a county that participate
in SNAP, as of July 2018.
model on lottery sales data from October 2008 through October 2009:69
log(Salesict) = α +
∑
τ 6=Feb 2009
βτSNAPict ∗ 1{t = τ}+ λct + λi + εict, (3.4)
where Salesict denotes the lottery ticket sales of store i in county c in month t.
SNAPict is an indicator for the SNAP-eligibility of store i. λi and λct are store and
county-month-year fixed effects, respectively. We restrict our sample to a balanced
panel of stores that maintain the same SNAP status throughout the period and are
present for all 13 months time period studied. This restriction helps ensure that β
is identified off of changes in lottery sales over time between the two groups and not
69This estimation uses the non-universe sample of stores that only captures 20% of all lottery
sales. Results may change when the updated data is received.
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Type ● Draw Scratch−Off
Note: Using PA Lottery sales data and SNAP store-eligibility, this figure plots difference in
lottery ticket sales at SNAP-eligible relative to expected sales had they evolved similarly to
sales at non-SNAP-eligible stores by month.
from changes in a store’s SNAP eligibility or from possible attrition given that the
Great Recession is occurring at this time.
Figure 3.5 plots the β coefficients over time. There is a striking drop in draw
lottery ticket sales at SNAP-eligible stores relative to what would have been expected
had sales evolved like those at non-SNAP-eligible stores. This drop begins soon after
ARRA is passed and then exhibits a significant and sustained decline after ARRA is
effective.
In order to obtain the average treatment effect, we estimate Equation 3.5 that
compares lottery sales in the pre-ARRA period with lottery sales in the post-ARRA
period (post-ARRA refers to its effective date):
log(Salesict) = α + βSNAPict ∗ PostARRA+ λct + λi + εict, (3.5)
Table 3.6 reports the results. Column (1) shows that after ARRA became effective,
draw lottery sales at SNAP-eligible stores experienced a 28% decline relative to their
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expected evolution if they followed the sales pattern at non-SNAP eligible stores.
However, scratch-off sales show no significant change after ARRA became effective.
Columns (3) and (4) allow for the effect of ARRA to vary based on the share of
households that receive SNAP benefits in each county. Counties with larger shares of
SNAP households experienced larger declines in draw lottery sales.
Table 3.6: Differences-in-Differences Estimation Results (ARRA Passage)
Log Sales
Draw Scratch Draw Scratch
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-ARRA −0.331∗∗∗ 0.013
(0.023) (0.010)
Post-ARRA : SNAP Density −2.633∗∗∗ 0.052
(0.163) (0.069)
Avg Sales 17304 21686 17304 21686
Store FE’s Y Y Y Y
County-Month FE’s Y Y Y Y
Observations 22,412 22,412 22,412 22,412
Adjusted R2 0.830 0.900 0.831 0.900
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Using lottery sales data from October 2008–October 2009, this table reports the
differences-in-differences coefficients from estimating Equation 3.5 which regresses log lottery
sales on an indicator for post-ARRA after controlling for store and county-year-month
fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) allow for the effect to vary based on county level SNAP
participation rates.
By combining the change in SNAP benefits that resulted from ARRA with the
change in lottery ticket sales at SNAP-eligible stores, we can quantify how much
lottery sales are expected to change as SNAP benefits change. Since the average
SNAP benefit increase was 13.6% and the estimated draw lottery sale decrease is 28%
(or 33 log-points), this implies that a 1% increase in SNAP benefits will correspond
with a 2.1% decrease in draw lottery sales.
This 28% decline is dramatic and should be interpreted with caution. Compared
to the universe of lottery sales used in our analysis of the government shutdown,
our analysis of ARRA only uses a sample that captures about 20% of lottery sales.
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Relative to the universe of stores, the composition of the sample is similar, based on
breakdown by store type and SNAP status. However, since we only have a sample
of stores, there is a risk this pattern could be generated by households shifting their
gambling from stores in our sample to stores not in our sample and that this is more
common for lottery purchases at SNAP stores. We will be able to address this concern
when we receive the universe of lottery sales because these shifts will show up as
increased sales at other stores.
Expiration of ARRA Benefits
Not only did ARRA increase benefits when it was adopted, but it also reduced benefits
when it expired in 2013. Upon expiration, SNAP benefits decreased by 5%, effective
November 1, 2013. This expiration provides another opportunity to examine how
lottery sales respond to changes in the SNAP program. We use this variation to
estimate another differences-in-differences model using data from May 2013 to May
2014:
log(Salesict) = α +
∑
τ 6=Oct 2013
βτSNAPict ∗ 1{t = τ}+ λt + λic + εict, (3.6)
where Salesict denotes the lottery ticket sales of store i in county c in month t.
SNAPict is an indicator for the SNAP-eligibility of store i. λi and λct are store and
county-month-year fixed effects, respectively. We restrict our sample to a balanced
panel of stores that maintain the same SNAP status throughout the period and are
present for all 13 months time period studied. This restriction helps ensure that β
is identified off of changes in lottery sales over time between the two groups and not
from changes in a store’s SNAP eligibility or from possible attrition.
Figure 3.6 plots the β coefficients over time. There appears to be a temporary
increase in draw lottery sales for about three months after ARRA expires and then
draw lottery sales revert back to the same trend as at non-SNAP stores (relative to
October 2013) by March 2014. On the other hand, scratch-off sales are elevated after
ARRA expires relative to how sales evolved at non-SNAP eligible stores starting in
October 2013. The fact that scratch-off tickets exhibit a strong response after ARRA
expiration could be due to its increasing popularity since 2010. Between 2010 and
2014, draw sales declined from 43% to 36% of total lottery sales. This is primarily
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Note: Using PA Lottery sales data and SNAP store-eligibility, this figure plots differences in
lottery ticket sales at SNAP-eligible relative to expected sales had they evolved similarly to
sales at non-SNAP-eligible stores by month.
because levels of draw ticket sales have been relatively flat while scratch-off sales have
been the source of almost all growth in lottery revenues. In nominal terms, scratch
off sales grew from $1.7 billion in 2010 to $2.4 billion in 2014 while draw tickets have
inched up from $1.3 billion in 2010 to $1.4 billion in 2014.
In order to obtain the average treatment effect, to quantify the relationship between
SNAP benefits and lottery sales, we estimate Equation 3.7 that compares lottery sales
in the six months prior to ARRA’s expiration with lottery sales in the six month
period after ARRA’s expiration:
log(Salesict) = α + βSNAPict ∗ ARRAExpire+ λct + λi + εict, (3.7)
Table 3.7 reports the results. Column (1) shows that draw lottery sales increased by
about two percent after ARRA expired relative to how they evolved at non-SNAP
stores. However, Column (2) shows that scratch-off tickets exhibited a larger increase
of seven percent after ARRA expired. As before, Columns (3) and (4) show that these
effects are increasing with the share of households within a county that receive SNAP
benefits. Combining these changes with the average 5% decline in SNAP benefits
experienced after ARRA’s expiration, we obtain that the elasticity of lottery sales
with respect to SNAP benefits is between -0.4 and -1.4. This is a smaller magnitude
than was estimated upon ARRA’s adoption, but the change in SNAP benefits was
smaller and the change was publicized about three months before it would take effect,
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so households may have been more able to anticipate the change (Rosenbaum and
Keith-Jennings 2013).70
Table 3.7: Differences-in-Differences Estimation Results (ARRA Expiration)
Log Sales
Draw Scratch Draw Scratch
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-ARRA 0.019∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.009)
Post-ARRA : SNAP Density 0.114∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.058)
Avg Sales 16516 31218 16516 31218
Store FE’s Y Y Y Y
County-Month FE’s Y Y Y Y
Observations 21,294 21,294 21,294 21,294
Adjusted R2 0.977 0.920 0.977 0.920
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
3.6 Conclusion and Future Research
This paper presents a new finding that SNAP benefits decrease lottery gambling.
Using new data on store-level lottery sales in Pennsylvania along with each store’s
SNAP eligibility status, we have a detailed view of lottery sales at a vast array of
retailers. By combining our detailed store panel with policy shocks to the SNAP
program, including the 2018–2019 government shutdown and the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009, we estimate the elasticity of lottery sales with respect
to SNAP benefits. While our estimates range widely from -2.1 to -0.4, we find that
lottery gambling decreases when SNAP benefits are increased.
These findings prompt a variety of questions related to public finance. Are these
findings unique to the SNAP program or do they apply to other transfer programs like
70These estimates are subject to the same caveat of sample selection as in the ARRA passage
section. However, given that there is not a dramatic economic upheaval during this period, dramatic
shifts in consumer behavior are less likely. As before, this possibility will be addressed when we
receive the updated universe of data.
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unemployment insurance or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. If the primary
mechanism is through shopping frequency, then we are unlikely to see similar effects
from non-nutritional assistance programs. More research will be needed to determine
what households spend this extra money on. Given that increases in gambling are
funded by decreases in food and housing spending, it might be true that savings from
not gambling (or not having gambling opportunities) are used to increase food and
housing expenditures.
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3.A Data Appendix
SNAP Store Eligibility Data
SNAP benefits cannot be redeemed at all stores, but eligibility requirements are
relatively relaxed. Many gas stations and convenience stores are eligible to accept
SNAP benefits. Stores must be “authorized” by the FNS in order to accept SNAP
benefits. In order to be eligible, stores must meet at least one of two staple food
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requirements, which are defined below.71,72 Staple foods are defined as “the basic
foods that make up a significant portion of a person’s diet and are usually prepared
at home and eaten as a meal.” The 4 categories are (1) fruits or vegetables; (2) meat,
poultry, or fish; (3) dairy products; and (4) breads or cereals. “Perishable” foods are
defined as foods that “would spoil or suffer significant deterioration in quality within
2-3 weeks at room temperature.” Shelf-stable foods that would deteriorate until after
being opened are not counted as “perishable.”
Criterion A (staple food inventory): Stores must stock 3 “stocking units”
(e.g., cans, bags, bunches, etc.) of 3 “varieties” of each of the 4 staple food categories.
This requires that they have 3 “stocking units” of 1 perishable food in 2 staple food
categories. In aggregate, this requires the store to have 36 stocking units (6 of
which must be perishable) of staple foods. A minimal assortment that would satisfy
these requirements would be the following (this has 1 more perishable variety than
necessary):
• Fruits/Vegetables: 3 cans of tomatoes, 3 cans of pineapple, 3 packages of
frozen tater tots (perishable)
• Meat: 3 cans of tuna, 3 packages of beef jerky, 3 packages of frozen chicken
nuggets (perishable)
• Dairy: 3 packages of powdered milk, 3 canisters of grated Parmesan, 3 cartons
of milk (perishable)
71These requirements were adopted on December 15, 2016 and made changes to the Criterion A
and B requirements. However, Sec. 765 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017 prevented
some of these rules from going into effect and reverted requirements to prior to the 2014 Farm Bill.
See RPMD Policy Memorandum 2018-04 for details. There may be some useful variation in this
policy change as well.
72Some stores that do not meet these criteria can still be eligible if they are in areas with
“significantly limited access to food.” The store must not be a restaurant and meet other SNAP
eligibility requirements. Stage 1 of this selection process requires the firm to be in or immediately
adjacent to a low-income, low-access census tract, which is defined by the USDA Economic Research
Service’s Food Access Research Atlas. Upon passing Stage 1, the firm goes to Stage 2 which computes
a Individualized Need for Access Calculator Tool that scores a firm based on proximity to meeting
Criteria A and B, distance from other SNAP authorized stores, vehicle access rate per the American
Community Service, firm’s hours of operation, and history of SNAP violations by the firm owner or
at the firm’s location. Upon exceeding the INFACT threshold, a firm will be granted SNAP eligibility
of a year, after which it must be re-evaluated. See RPMD Policy Memorandum 2018-03 for details.
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• Bread/Cereals: 3 boxes of pasta, 3 boxes of cereal, 3 bags of rice
Criterion B (staple food sales): Staple food sales must make up more than
50% of gross retail sales. There are no stocking requirements, stores must simply meet
the sales requirement.
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